SHYAM LAL YADEV Vs. KUSUM DHAWAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) We have no alternative but to allow this appeal which has come up by special leave. A brief narrative of fasciculus of facts is necessary to appreciate why the appeal must be allowed.

(2.) The appellants represent the managing committee of a private college by name Lal Bahadur Shastri Girl's Inter College, Mugalsarai. At a meeting held on 13-2-1978 the said committee considered the alleged misconduct of the 1st respondent, the Principal Srimati Kusum Dhawan and found that it was sufficiently serious to warrant an enquiry and suspension forthwith. Consequently, she was suspended subject to further enquiry. The said suspension order was confirmed by the Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools, Varanasi, a statutory functionary under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. Smarting under the suspension, the principal moved the Civil Court for an injunction against the Management and obtained an ex parte order restraining the appellant management from interfering with her work as the Principal. This order was promptly rescinded when the appellant explained the facts to the trial court. Thereupon, the aggrieved principal appealed to the District Court with success. The frustrated management filed a second appeal to the High Court which passed the order under challenge before us. The High Court held, for reasons which are obscure, that while the management had the legal title to manage, the Principal should not be prejudiced by the suspension order and so should be allowed to function. That is to say, while upholding the power of the management to suspend, the court, nevertheless, prevented it from exercising their power.

(3.) It is apposite to state that there was some rivalry between two sets of persons regarding the right to be the Managing Committee. According to the appellants they were duly elected to power, while the opposite group contested this claim. Indeed, there is a litigation at their instance challenging the right of the appellant committee. Although this rival group is a party to the present proceedings, we are not concerned with the relative merits and the competing claims of the two sets of persons who have clashed on the issue to the right to manage. The only question before us is as to whether there is a prima facie case in favour of the appellant as the competent management and further whether there is prima facie ground to hold that order of suspension imposed upon the principal is legal. Moreover, there is an important obstacle in the way of the principal which has not been adequately understood by the Courts below. The suit itself is barred by Section 16-G (7) of the Act which reads: