FIRM SARDARILAL VISHWANATH Vs. PRITAM SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The unsuccessful tenant in this appeal by special leave drawing his sustenance from an apparent but unreal conflict amongst certain decisions of this Court as noticed by the Kerala High Court in Lalitha v. Ayisumma, (1977) 2 Ren CR 690 made a furious attempt to re-open the controversy:whether a statutory tenant is entitled to notice as envisaged by S. 106 of the T. P. Act before an action in ejectment is commenced against him under any of the enabling provisions of the relevant Rent Restriction Act.

(2.) Mr. V. C. Mahajan, learned counsel for the appellant canvassed two contentions before us:(1) As the respondent landlord had not terminated the tenancy of the appellant by a notice to quit as contemplated by S. 106 of the T. P. Act, an action in ejectment under S. 13 of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for short "the Act") is not maintainable; (2) Though the landlord sought eviction on the ground that the building was likely to fall down as it was in a dilapidated condition and had become unsafe for human habitation, the very fact that for the last 15 years the building is standing and the tenant is occupying and using it, it would ipso facto negative the case of the landlord that the building has become unsafe and unfit for human habitation.

(3.) The backdrop of facts is this:the tenant, a firm, under two separate rent notes from two separate landlords having specified shares in the demised premises, took on lease the premises and the tenancy commenced from 1st January 1960 and the demise was for a period of 11 months. On the expiry of the period reserved by the lease, the tenant continued in possession. If the period reserved under the lease was of 11 months, obviously the lease determined by efflux of time limited thereby as provided in S. 111 (a) of the T. P. Act. Section 116 provides for effect of holding over. If a lessee of property remains in possession thereof after the determination of the lease and the lessor accepts rent from the lessee or otherwise assents to his continuing in possession, the lease is, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, renewed from year to year, or from month to month, according to the purpose for which the property is leased, as specified in S. 106. Ordinarily, acceptance of rent from a lessee whose lease determined by efflux of time, would manifest the assent of the lessor to the lessee continuing in possession and in that event the lease would be renewed from year to year or month to month as the case may be, and the lessee would be a lessee holding over. This position which emerged under the provisions of the T. P. Act underwent a basic change when the Rent Restriction Act was put on the statute book. The lessor, on the introduction of the Rent Restriction Act could not seek to evict the lessee on the only ground that the lease determined by efflux of time. The lessee was clothed with the protection of Rent Restriction Act. In such a situation the lessor, unless he wanted to proceed under the provisions of the Rent Restriction Act, had no option but to accept the rent and, therefore, acceptance of rent from a lessee clothed with the protection of Rent Restriction Act would not manifest the intention of the lessor to renew the lease. Something more than mere payment and acceptance of rent would be necessary to assert that the lessor has assented to the lessee continuing in possession and the lessor intended the renewal of the lease. Except for the acceptance of rent after the lease determined by efflux of time, nothing was pointed out to us to show that the lessor had otherwise assented to the lessee continuing in possession so as the infer the renewal of lease. Therefore, the lessee in this case is indisputably a statutory tenant and cannot seek any assistance from the provisions contained in S. 116 of the T. P. Act. Mr. Mahajan proceeded to make his submission on the footing that the appellant is a statutory tenant.