(1.) This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Madras High Court dated December 4, 1975, quashing the "proceedings pending in S. C. No. 2 of 1970 on the file of the First Assistant Sessions Judge, Madras". The facts giving rise to the appeal have been stated in the petition for special leave and have not been disputed.
(2.) Respondent K. V. Sundravelu carried on business as an exporter in Madras. He had a quota for the export of the handloom fabric known as "Bleeding Madras" for the period April 1, 1965 to March 31, 1966. It was one of the conditions of his export license that he should produce the goods for pre-shipment inspection by officers of the Textile Committee who had the authority to affix the date seals, monogram seals and the quality marking seals containing the trade mark of the All India Handloom Board. The seals were affixed by the concerned Textile Inspector after random inspection of the quality of the fabric. Such an inspection was made in July 1965 the fabric was put in bales, and the bales were sealed with lead seal. It was found, on a fresh inspection of one of the bales before actual loading, that the inside seals had been tampered with and there were forged date seals. The shipment was therefore stopped and all the goods were examined between July 27, 1965 and July 30, 1975 (sic). As the respondent was found to have committed offences under Ss. 420, 471 read with S. 466 of the Indian Penal Code and S. 132 of the Customs Act, he was chargesheeted and was committed to the court of Session after the necessary inquiry. The Court split the case into two, so that Sessions Case No. 34 of 1968 was registered for the trial of the offence relating to 93 bales which were covered by a particular invoice, and Sessions Case No. 2 of 1970 was registered for the goods relating to 19 bales which were covered by a different invoice. The first case (S. C. No. 34 of 1968) proceeded to trial and ended in the conviction of the respondent. He was however given the benefit of doubt on appeal and was acquitted by the judgment of the High Court dated March 9, 1974. The second case (S. C. No. 2 of 1970), which is the subject matter of the present appeal was then taken up for trial by the First Assistant Sessions Judge, Madras. The respondent applied to the High Court for quashing the "proceedings." As has been stated, his application was allowed by the High Court and the proceedings have been quashed by the impugned judgment.
(3.) It was urged before the High Court that Sessions Case No. 2 of 1970 was different from the earlier case (SC. No. 34 of 1968) and should be allowed to proceed to trial, but the High court thought it proper to go through the record which was received from the court of the committing magistrate and took the view that the present case was "substantially the same as the other case which ended in acquittal." In doing so it made a reference to its finding in the earlier case and held as follows: