LAWS(SC)-1978-9-16

KAILASH Vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

Decided On September 12, 1978
KAILASH Appellant
V/S
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) By a judgment dated 18th August, 1971, the Civil and Session Judge, Gonda, convicted the appellants Kailash and Ram Sunder, who are first cousins, under Section 302 with Section 34 of the Penal Code and sentenced them to imprisonment for life. The charge against the appellants is that at about 1-45 P. M. on November 3, 1969, they, in pursuance of their common intention, committed the murder of one Mahraji by strangulating her. The order of conviction and sentence having been confirmed by the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) on April 22, 1974, the appellants have filed this appeal by special leave.

(2.) Shri Kohli who appears on behalf of the appellants has left hardly anything unsaid which could, with reason and profit, be said in favour of the appellants. He contends, if we may so compress his arguments, that (1) though it is alleged that the appellants were armed with a Gandasa and a Bhujali, admittedly, they did not use those weapons; (2) though quite a few persons had gathered outside the room of Mahraji, the appellants were allowed to escape; (3) knowing that the appellants were inside the room and Mahraji was struggling to save her life, none of the villagers chained the room from outside; and that, (4) if Subhadra (P. W. 3) had seen the appellants entering Maharaji's room, it is hardly likely that they would still be inside the room when, on hearing Subhadra's shouts, the villagers ran towards the scene of offence. In a nutshell, the learned counsel contends that the prosecution witnesses have given their evidence mechanically and have made out a typical 'Wooden case', which deserves to be rejected outright.

(3.) Learned counsel also urged that the case is essentially one of circumstantial evidence and therefore, it is necessary that the circumstances must be proved cogently and they must be consistent with one hypothesis only, namely, that the accused are guilty of the crime with which they are charged. It is urged that even assuming that the circumstances on which the prosecution relies are proved as required by law, the chain of circumstances is not so complete as to justify the compelling inference that the accused have committed the crime which is imputed to them.