DELHI ADMINISTRATION DELHI Vs. WORKMEN OF EDWARD KEVENTERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A very short question as to the scope of Section 10 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, arises for consideration in this appeal by special leave. The appellant, Delhi Administration, was faced with the question of referring several disputes, 16 in number, for adjudication under S. 10 (1) of the Act. The workmen had raised all these disputes although many of them were perhaps covered by an earlier settlement. We are not concerned with the facts of this particular case which have been set out at some length by the High Court in its judgment, but with a narrow issue as to when the power to prohibit a strike with which the State/appropriate Government is armed under S. 10 (3) of the Act can be put into operation. This turns on a reasonable construction of the provision itself and the best beginning is to quote the section itself. Section 10 (3) runs thus:

(2.) A plain reading of the sub-section leaves no room for doubt in our mind that the High Court has correctly interpreted it. Indeed, the learned Judges have gone into details, although we in this affirming judgment desire to express ourselves only briefly. Two conditions are necessary to make Section 10 (3) applicable. There must be an industrial dispute existing and such existing dispute must have been referred to a Board, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal under this section, namely, Section 10 (1). Section 10 stands as a self-contained Code as it were so far as this subject-matter is concerned. The prohibitory power springs into existence only when such dispute has been made the subject of reference under S. 10 (1). What then is such dispute The suchness of the dispute is abundantly brought out in the preceding portion of the sub-section. Clearly, there must be an industrial dispute in existence. Secondly, such dispute must have been already referred for adjudication. Then, and then alone, the power to prohibit in respect of such referred dispute can be exercised.

(3.) There is a distinction between strikes being illegal under other sections of the Act and penalties being available against such illegal strikes on the one hand and strikes being contrary to S. 10 (3) of the Act and liable to be prohibited thereunder. This distinction once grasped, the baselessness of the submission on behalf of the appellant necessarily follows.