ARBIND KUMAR SINGH Vs. NAND KISHORE PRASAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) On January 15, 1965, the South Bihar Regional Transport Authority, Patna, ordered that a permit to ply a stage carriage on Dehri Bhabua route be granted to Arbind Kumar Singh - hereinafter called 'the appellant'-"on production of all valid documents of 1964 model bus along with clearance certificate of transport tax within one month from the date, of order, failing which the sanction of permit in his favour would stand automatically revoked, and permit will then be given to the next deserving candidate Nand Kishore Prasad * * * *" On application submitted by Nand Kishore Prasad - who will hereinafter be referred to as 'the respondent' - that the appellant had failed to carry out the condition relating to the grant of permit, the Chairman of the Regional Transport Authority by order dated February 20, 1965, cancelled the permit and directed that a permit be given to the respondent. The order of the Chairman was reversed in appeal by the Appellate Board. In the view of the Board "the clearance certificate" filed by the appellant showed that all the taxes due by him were paid.

(2.) The respondent then moved the State Government of Bihar under S. 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as amended by the Bihar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act 17 of 1950. The Minister of Transport who heard the petition reversed the order of the Appellate Board, holding that the appellant had failed to carry out the conditions subject to which the Regional Transport Authority had ordered that the permit be given to him. A petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution moved by the appellant in the High Court of Patna against the order of the Minister of Transport was dismissed. The appellant has appealed to this Court with certificate granted by the High Court.

(3.) The plea raised by counsel for the respondent that the appeal was liable to be dismissed because the High Court was incompetent to grant a certificate of fitness under Art. 133 (1) (a) or Art. 133 (1) (b) of the Constitution against the Judgment of the High Court exercising extraordinary original jurisdictions under Art. 226 of the Constitution is without substance. This Court has held in S. A L. Narayan Row vs. Ishwarlal Bhagwandas, (1966) 1 SCR 190 that the words "civil proceeding" used in Art. 133 of the Constitution cover all proceedings which directly affect civil rights. A proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution for a writ to bring up a proceeding for consideration concerning civil rights is therefore a civil proceeding. This Court has further held in Ramesh vs. Gendalal Motilal Patni, (1966) 3 SCR 198 that the High Court is competent to certify on appeal against an order passed by a Division Bench of a High Court in exercise of extraordinary original jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution if the dispute decided thereby concerns civil rights of the parties. Hidayatullah, J., speaking for the Court observed at page No. 203 of SCR: