KESHAVLAL JETHALAL SHAH Vs. MOHANLAL BHAGWANDAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The respondents sued the appellant for a decree in ejectment in respect of shop Municipal Census No. 1754 at Ahmedabad and for rent in arrears and additional taxes. The Trial Court dismissed the claim for ejectment and passed a decree for arrears of rent and permitted increases. In appeal under sec. 29 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 57 of 1947, the decree was confirmed on February 25, 1963. By sec. 29(2) of that Act, as it then stood, no appeal lay against any decision in appeal under sub-sec. (1) from the order of the Court of First Instance. The respondent accordingly moved the High Court of Gujarat by a petition under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. When this petition was pending in the High Court, Bombay Act 57 of 1947 was amended by Gujarat Act 18 of 1965, and sub-sec. (2) of sec. 29 was replaced by the following substation:

(2.) This Court in Vora Abbasbhai Alimahomed v. Haji Gulamnabi Haji Safibhai ((1964) 5 S. C. R. 157: (V G. L. R. 55), held that in a petition under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure from an order made by the appellate Court under sec. 29 of Bombay Act 57 of 1947, the High Court had no power to set aside the order merely because it was of opinion that the judgment was assailable on the ground of fact or even of law the High Court may exercise its power under that section only if the appellate Court had acted without jurisdiction or had failed to exercise its jurisdiction or had acted with material illegality or irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. Thereafter the Gujarat Legislature amended sec. 29(2) by Act 18 of 1965 in the manner set out, so Jo confer upon the High Court a jurisdiction wider than the jurisdiction exercisable under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(3.) Counsel for the appellant contended that in entering upon an enquiry into the questions raised by the respondent, the High Court exercised jurisdiction which it did not possess. Counsel contended that the right to appeal-and which expression includes the right to move a superior Court in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction-attaches to a litigation when it commences and it is not affected by any subsequent amendments unless an express provision is made giving retrospective operation to the amendment and that the right to appeal which originally attached to the litigation will continue to govern it till it is finally decided. Counsel relied in support of that contention upon the decisions in Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. v. Irving ((1905) A. C. 369); Garikapatti Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury ((1957) S. C. R. 488); and Nana Bin Aba v. Sheku Bin Andu (I. L. R. 32 Bom. 337).