STATE BANK OF INDIA Vs. RAJENDRA KUMAR SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE following Judgment of the court was delivered by

(2.) THIS appeal is brought from the order of the High court of Madhya Pradesh dated 5/04/1963 in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 135 of 1962 under section 520 of the Code of Criminal Procedure directing the return of 21 currency notes of the denomination of Rs. 1,000.00 each to respondents Rajendra Kumar Singh and Virendra Singh.

(3.) IN Support of this appeal, it was contended in the first place that the High court had' reversed the order of the Sessions Judge directing the return of the currency notes without giving a notice to the appellant and without giving an opportunity to it for being heard. The argument was stressed that there was a violation of the principle of natural justice and the order of the High court dated 5/04/1963 was illegal. It was, however, contended on behalf of the respondents that there was no provision in section 520 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for giving notice to the affected parties and the order of the High court cannot be challenged on the ground that no hearing was given to the appellant. IN our opinion, there is no warrant or justification for the argument advanced on behalf of the respondents. It is true that the statute does not expressly require a notice to be issued, or a hearing to be given to the parties adversely affected. But though the statute is silent and does not expressly require issue of any notice there is in the eye 'of law a necessary implication that the party adversely affected should be heard before the court makes an order for return of the seized property. The principle is clearly stated in the leading case of Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works(x). IN that ease section 76 of the Metropolis Local Amendment Act, 1855 authorised the District Board to demolish the building if it had been constructed by the owner without giving notice to the Board of his intention to build. The statute laid down no procedure for the exercise of the power of demolition, and, therefore, the Board demolished the house in exercise of the above power without issuing a notice to the owner of the house. It was held by the court of Common Pleas that' the Board was liable in damages for not having given notice o,f their order before they proceeded to execute it. Erie, C,J. held that the power was subject to a qualification repeatedly recognised that no man is to be deprived of his property without his having an opportunity of being heard and that this had been applied to `many exercises of power which in common understanding would not be at all a more judicial proceeding than would be the act of the district board in ordering a house to be pulled down`. Willes, J. said that the rule was `of universal application and rounded upon the plainest principles of justice` and Byles, J. said that `although there are no positive words in a statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature.` The same principle has been reaffirmed in a recent case Ridge v. Baldwin(2). IN that case, section 191 of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1881 provided that a watch committee may at any time suspend or dismiss any borough constable whom they think negligent in the discharge of his duty, or otherwise unfit for the same. The appellant, who was the chief constable of a borough police force, was dismissed by the watch committee on the ground that he was negligent in the discharge of his duties as thief constable. He brought an action against the members of the watch committee by stipulating that his dismissal was illegal and ultra vires the powers. It was held by the House of Lords that the decision of the watch committee was ultra vires because they dismissed the appellant on the ground of neglect of duty and as such they were bound to observe the principles of natural justice by informing him of the charges made against him and giVing him an opportunity of being heard. The same principle was applied by this court in Board of High School and INtermediate Education. U.P.. Allahabad v. Ghanshvam Day Gupta and Ors. (1). It was held in that case that an examination committee of the Board of Secondary Education in Uttar Pradesh was acting quasi-judicially when exercising its Dower under rule 1 (1) of Ch. VI of the Regulations dealing with cases of examinees using unfair means in examination hall and the principle of natural justice which require that the examinee must be heard. will apply to the proceedings before the Committee. Though there was nothing express one way or the other in the Act or the Regulations casting a duty on the committee to act judicially, where no opportunity whatever was given to the examinee to give an explanation and present their case before the Committee. the Resolution of the committee cancelling their results and depriving them from appearing at the next examination was defective. Applying the Principle to the present case it is manifest that the High court was bound to give notice to the appellant before reversing the order of the Sessions judge directing the disposal1 of the property under s. 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As no such notice was given to the appellant. the order of the High court dated 5/04/1963 is vitiated in law.