BIDYA DEB BARMA Vs. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE TRIPURA AGARTALA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE following Judgment of the court was delivered by

(2.) THESE are five writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India by persons detained under the Preventive Detention Act (4 of 1950) by virtue of orders passed by the District Magistrate Tripura on 2/02/1968. THESE detenus (and another since released) were arrested on 11/02/1968. State government was informed of the fact of detention on February 13, and the grounds of detention were communicated to the detenus on February 15. State government gave the approval on February 19 and telegraphically communicated to the central government the fact of the detention on February 22 under section 3(4). On March 11, the Advisory Board considered the cases. The present petitions were filed on 12/03/1968. The Advisory Board made its report to the State government under section 10 of the Act on 17/04/1968. On Ap 26/04/1968, the State government made the order detaining the petitioners for a period of one year. This detention is challenged before us.

(3.) THE order of detention in each case was made on the 9th of February. THE arrest and detention commenced from the 11th. THE communication .was on February 13. Section 3 (3) of the Act lays down: '3. THE central government or the State government may (1) (3) When any order is made under this section (by an officer mentioned in subsection (2) he shall forthwith report' the act to the State Government to which he is subordinate together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in his opinion (have a bearing on the matter, and no such order made after the commencement of the Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act, 1952, shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof unless in the meantime it has been approved by the State government).' THE question is whether the detention became illegal because 4 days were allowed to pass from the order of detention and 2 days from the date of arrest. THE third Ss. quoted above uses the word 'forthwith'., Explaining this word Maxwell in Interpretation of Statutes (Eleventh Edn.) at p. 341 observes as follows: 'When a statute requires that'something shall be done 'forthwith', or 'immediately' or even 'instantly', it should probably be understood as allowing a reasonable time for doing it.' THE word 'forthwith' in section 3 (3) and the phrase 'as soon as may be' used in thn the fourth Ss. were considered in Keshav Nilkanth Joglekar v. THE Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay(1). In that case the delay was of 8 days.. Giving proper meaning to the expression it was observed: 'We agree that 'forthwith' in section 3 (3) cannot mean the same thing as 'as soon as may be' in section 7, and that the former is more preemptory than the latter. THE difference between the two expressions lies, in our opinion, in this that while under section 7 the time that is allowed to the authority to send the communication to the detenu is what is reasonably convenient, under section 3 (3) what is allowed is only the period during which he could not, without any fault of his own, send the report.' THE delay of 8 days was held explained thus: 'What happened on the 16th and the following days are now matters of history. THE great city of Bombay was convulsed in disorders, which are among the worst that this country has witnessed. THE Bombay police had a most difficult task to perform in securing life and property, and the authorities must have been working at high pressure in maintaining law and order. It is obvious that the Commissioner was not sleeping over the orders which he had passed or lounging supinely overthem. THE delay such as it is, is due to causes not of his making, but to causes to which the activities of the petitioners very largely contributed. We have no hesitation in accepting the affidavit, and we hold that the delay in sending the report could not have been avoided by the Commissioner and that when they were sent by him, they were sent 'forthwith' within the meaning of section 3(3) of the Act.'