(1.) This appeal by special leave is directed against the concurring judgment and orders of the courts below, allowing the intervention of respondents 1 and 2, and adding them as defendants 2 and 3, in the suit instituted by the appellant against her alleged husband, now respondent No. 3, who was the sole defendant in the suit as originally framed. The main question in controversy in this appeal, is the true construction of sub-r. (2) of R. 10 of O. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and its application to the facts of this case, which are given below:
(2.) On 12-4-1957, the plaintiff - appellant in this Court - instituted the suit out of which this appeal arises against the third respondent who is the second son of His Exalted Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad, and who will, hereinafter be referred to as the Prince. In the plaint, she alleged that she is the lawfully married wife of the Prince, the marriage ceremony (Nikah) having been solemnized in accordance with the Shia Law, by a Shia Mujtahid on 19-10-1948. The plaintiff also averred that the issue of the marriage, were three daughters aged 8, 7 and 5 years; that the fact of the marriage was known to all persons acquainted with the Prince; that there was a pre-nuptial agreement, whereby, the Prince agreed to pay Rs. 2,000 per month to the plaintiff as kharch-e-pandan; that the Prince stopped the payment of the allowance aforesaid of Rs. 2,000 per month, since January, 1953, without any reasons and in contravention of the said agreement. On these allegations, she asked for the following two declarations:
(3.) On these allegations and counter allegations, after hearing the parties, the trial court, by its judgment and order dated 6-7-1957, allowed the application for intervention, and directed the respondents 1 and 2 to be added as defendants. The court, after discussing all the contentions raised on behalf of the parties, observed that there were indications in the record of a possible collusion between the plaintiff and the defendant; that the relief claimed under S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, being discretionary, could not be granted as of right; that the presence of the interveners would help the court in unravelling the mysteries of the litigation, and that there was force in the contention put forward on behalf of the interveners that under S. 43 of the Specific Relief Act, any declaration given in favour of the plaintiff, will be binding upon the interveners. It also held that in order effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle the present controversy, the presence of the interveners was necessary.