KAPUR CHAND POKHRAJ Vs. STATE OF BOMBAY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These appeals by special leave are directed against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay made in three connected Criminal Revision applications and raise the question of the maintainability of prosecution of a person for an offence committed under S. 24(1)(b) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946 (Bom. V of 1946) (hereinafter referred to as the repealed Act.)

(2.) The facts that give rise to the appeals may be briefly stated: The appellant, Sri Kapur Chand Pokhraj, was the proprietor of Messrs. N. Deepaji Merawalla, a firm dealing in bargles and registered under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946. He did not disclose the correct turnover of his sales to the Sales Tax Department in the three quarterly returns furnished by him to the said Department on 30-9-1950, 31-12-1950, and 31-3-1951, respectively. He maintained double sets of books of accounts and knowingly furnished false returns for the said three quarters to the Sales Tax Officer and thereby committed an offence under S. 24(1) (B) of the repealed Act. Under that Act, sanction of the Collector was a condition precedent for launching of prosecution in respect of an offence committed under S. 24(1) of the said Act. The said Act was repealed by the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952 (Bom. XXIV of 1952), which was published on 9-10-1952. On 11-12-1952, the Bombay High Court declared the Act of 1952 ultra vires and the State of Bombay preferred an appeal against the judgment of the Bombay High Court to the Supreme Court. On 22-12-1952, the State Government, in order to get over the dislocation caused by the Bombay judgment, issued the Bombay Sales Tax Ordinance II of 1952, whereunder it was provided that the 1946 Act was to be deemed to have been in existence upto 1-11-1952. On 24-12-1952, another Ordinance, Ordinance III of 1952, was promulgated extending the life of the Act of 1946. On 25-3-1953, the Bombay State Legislature passed the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953 (Bom. III of 1953), (hereinafter referred to as the repealing Act), repealing the Act of 1946 and the Ordinance III of 1952. The material fact to be noticed is that the Act III of 1953, though it repealed the earlier Act and the Ordinance extending the life of that Act, made provision for an offence similar to that covered by S. 24(1) of the repealed Act, prescribed a similar procedure for prosecuting persons committing the said offence and saved the liabilities incurred under the repealed Act. During the period when the Ordinance III of 1952 was in force, the State Government issued a notification under S. 3 of that Ordinance appointing the Additional Collector of Bombay to be a Collector under the said Ordinance. On 4-7-1953, i.e., after Act III of 1953 came into force, Mr. Joshi, the Additional Collector of Bombay, granted sanction for the prosecution of the appellant in respect of the offence committed by him under S. 24(1)(b) of the repealed Act. After obtaining the sanction, the appellant was prosecuted under S. 24(1)(b) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946. Before the Presidency Magistrate the appellant pleaded guilty to the charge. The learned Magistrate accepted his plea and convicted him for the offence for which he was charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 200, in default to suffer one month's rigorous imprisonment. The State of Bombay preferred a Revision against the said Order to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay praying that the sentence imposed on the appellant be enhanced on the ground that as the appellant kept double sets of accounts and intentionally furnished false information, the interest of justice required that substantive and heavy sentence should be imposed on him. Before the High Court, the appellant pleaded that by the repeal of the Sales Tax Act, 1946, the offence, if any, committed by him was effaced and that in any view the prosecution was defective in as much as sanction had been given by the Additional Collector and not by the Collector of Sales Tax. The contentions did not find favour with the learned Judge of the High Court. In rejecting them, the learned Judge enhanced the sentence passed upon the appellant to rigorous imprisonment for a period of one month in each of the three cases in addition to the fine already imposed by the Magistrate. He directed the substantive sentence of imprisonment in all the three cases to be concurrent. The appellant obtained special leave from this Court to prefer the above appeals against the judgment of the High Court.

(3.) The learned Counsel for the appellant raised before us the same contentions which his client unsuccessfully raised before the High Court. We shall now proceed to deal with them seriatim.