(1.) THE appellant, appointed as an Assistant Director of Physical Education in maharshi Dayanand University, Rohtak, claimed revised pay scales at Rs. 550-900 w. e. f. 14. 7. 1979, Rs. 700-1600 w. e. f. 1. 4. 1980, Rs. 2200-4000 w. e. f. 1. 1. 1986 and rs. 3000-5000 w. e. f. 14. 7. 1987. His request for grant of the said revised pay scales was rejected by the University by communication dated 10. 04. 1991. The said rejection was challenged by the appellant in Civil Writ Petition No. 4262 of 1992 in the High court of Punjab and Haryana. The writ petition was dismissed on 05. 08. 1992. The appellant challenged the decision of the High Court in Special Leave Petition (C)No. 16068 of 1992. This Court dismissed the SLP.
(2.) THE appellant thereafter started a second round of litigation. He approached the Civil Court (Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Rohtak) in Civil Suit no. 194 of 1993 for a declaration that the University's action issuing letter dated 10. 04. 1991 refusing the revision of pay scales was illegal, null and void and for a direction awarding pay scales of Rs. 550-900 w. e. f. 14. 7. 1979, Rs. 700-1600 w. e. f. 1. 4. 1980, Rs. 2000-4000 w. e. f. 1. 1. 1986 and Rs. 3000-5000 w. e. f. 14. 7. 1987. On contest, by a considered judgment the said suit was dismissed on 09. 09. 2002.
(3.) AS noticed above, there have been three rounds of litigation seeking the same relief. The first is Writ Petition No. 4262 of 1992 and SLP (C)No. 16068 of 1992 wherein the prayer has been rejected. The second is in Civil Suit No. 194 of 1993 and in Appeal No. 96 of 2002/2003 which also ended in dismissal. The present third round of litigation is for the very same relief. It is clear that the claim is liable to be rejected having regard to Section 11 CPC and Order 2 Rule 2 CPC. Even on merits, we find that the appellant is not entitled to any relief. The resolution dated 20. 08. 1997 could not be given effect as the requisite prior approval of the State Government was not obtained and as a representative of the State Government was not present at the time of such resolution. Therefore, Section 9f and 11a came in the way of giving effect to the resolution. Even otherwise we find that the writ petition filed in the year 2003 to enforce the resolution passed in 1997 nearly six years later, was liable to be rejected even on the ground of delay and laches. Viewed from any angle the appeal deserves to be rejected.