PRAHLAD SINGH Vs. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal is directed against the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated 7th September, 1992 in Criminal Appeal No. 34 of 1986. The High Court by the impugned judgment set aside the order of acquittal of the appellant passed by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Sagar (MP), in Sessions Trial No. 185 of 1984 and convicted the appellant under Section 376, I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years.

(2.) The appellant stood charged of the offence of committing rape on the allegation that on 26th May, 1984 he committed rape on a minor girl Kumari Sarvesh, PW. 5 when the girl was playing outside her house in the company of her two younger sisters. The prosecution alleged that while the prosecutrix PW. 5 was playing, the appellant induced her and then took her outside the military camp and subjected her to sexual assault on account of which the girl started profusely bleeding. Her father, Siyaram, PW. 9 went in search of the girl and found her standing on the road and crying, as the accused had left her near that place. The girl then narrated the incident to her father who lodged a report which was treated as F.I.R. and police thereafter started investigation. The further prosecution case is that on suspicion the appellant who was also an army jawan was arrested and his identification parade was held on 23-7-1984 by PW. 2 wherein the appellant was identified by the prosecutrix. On completion of investigation the charge-sheet was submitted and the accused stood the trial. The learned Sessions Judge relying upon the evidence of Doctor PW. 4, prosecutrix PW. 5 and her parents PWs. 7 and 9 came to the conclusion that on the relevant date of occurrence the prosecutrix was raped. But so far as the complicity of the appellant with the incident is concerned, the learned Sessions Judge could not find any reliable evidence and acquitted him of the charge. On an appeal being carried, the High Court by the impugned judgment interfered with the order of acquittal and relying upon the evidence of the prosecutrix more particularly the identification of the appellant by the prosecutrix convicted the appellant as already stated.

(3.) The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that there is not an iota of acceptable evidence before the Court which can be said to have brought home the charge against the appellant and the High Court committed an error in altering an order of acquittal to one of conviction by mere surmises and conjectures. The learned Counsel urged that so far as the so called identification-parade which was held on 23-7-1984 is concerned no credence can be given to the same as inasmuch as the same identification-parade was held two months after the incident and that the accused was shown to the prosecutrix earlier to the identification in question. According to the learned Counsel the Sessions Judge rightly did not give any credence to the identification. In this Court also the counsel appearing for the appellant stated that no credence can be given to the so called identification that was held two months after the occurrence wherein the prosecutrix is alleged to have identified the accused. It may be appropriate to extract in this connection the statement of the prosecutrix in cross-examination wherein she stated: