UNION OF INDIA Vs. SHER SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal, by special leave, arises from the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi, made on May 30, 1991 in R.F.A. No. 167/86.

(2.) The admitted facts are that notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was published acquiring certain lands for public purpose. Therein rival claims came to be made by Gaon Sabha, Tekhand and the respondents claiming title to the compensation. Since the Land Acquisition Officer/Collector was unable to decide the title to receive the compensation on reference under Section 30 of the Act, the District Court by award and decree dated February 22, 1986 held that the land in question stood vested in the Gaon Sabha under Section 7 read with Section 154 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act (for short, the Act). Therefore, it is entitled to the compensation of the land acquired by the Union of India. Dissatisfied therewith, the respondents filed the above appeal. The High Court in the impugned judgment has held that "Gair Mumkin Pahar" is a cultivable land and, therefore, by operation of Explanation to Section 7, it stands excluded from the vesting in the Gaon Sabha. Resultantly , the respondents being the owners of the property are entitled to the compensation. Thus, this appeal by special leave.

(3.) Initially, Shri M. C. Dhingra, learned Counsel for some of the respondents, has brought to our notice that since this Court had dismissed similar special leave petitions, this appeal does not merit consideration. We find no force in the contention. This Court, by then, had already granted leave in this appeal, but, unfortunately that was not brought to the notice of the respective Benches including the one presided over by one of us (K. Ramaswamy, J.), when the matters had come up. As a consequence, without any speaking order some special leave petitions came to be dismissed. In view of the settled legal position by a catena of decisions of this Court that the dismissal of special leave petition without speaking order does not constitute res judicata, the question of law is at large to be gone into. Accordingly, we reject the objection and we have heard the Counsel on both sides on merits.