(1.) These appeals are directed against the judgment of the Allahabad high court in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 13067 of 1982. The competent authority determined the surplus area of the appellant under the provisions of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations) Act, 1976 to an extent of 1495.971 sq. mts. Aggrieved by that the appellant preferred an appeal to the appellate authority, the District Judge, Gorakhpur. Before the appellate authority the appellant was successful in getting an extent of 318.88 sq. mts, taken out of the surplus area determined by the prescribed authority. Against that decision of the appellate authority both the appellant as well as the State preferred two writ petitions before the High court. The learned Judge after referring the facts relating to the case and purporting to follow the decision of this court in State of U. P. v. L. J. Johnson held that the appellate authority was not right in allowing an extent of 318.88 sq. mts. occupied by the dwelling unit to be taken out from the surplus area and accordingly the High court restored the surplus area determined by the prescribed authority.
(2.) Aggrieved by that, the present two appeals are preferred. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant brought to our notice two judgments of this court namely Meera Gupta v. State of w. B. and Atma Ram Aggarwal v. State of U. P. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that in these two cases the judgment of this court in L. J. Johnson case was taken note of and distinguished on facts and according to the learned counselthe judgment in Meera Gupta case applies to the facts of the present case and on that ground the appeals are to be allowed.
(3.) The learned counsel for the State on the other hand submitted that though the principle laid down in Meera Gupta case applies to the facts of these cases that has not noticed the effect of Section 4 (2 read with Section 4 (9 and 4 (11 in the correct perspective and therefore, requires reconsideration. We have gone through the judgments and we are of the view that there is no substance in the argument that the latter judgments of this court require reconsideration,