SARDAR MOHAR SINGH Vs. MANGILAL ALIAS MANGTYA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Delay condoned.

(2.) This special leave petition arises from the judgment of the learned single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, made on 4/10/1996 incivil Revision No. 394 of 1996. The petitioner had entered into a contract with the respondent for sale of agricultural lands in Khasra Nos. 52, 61, 73, 74, 79, admeasuring 3-533, 0-166, 1-437, 0. 384, 0. 202 hectares and also an agreement to sell dated 7/7/1977 in respect of lands situated in Village khode, for a consideration of Rs. 25,000. 00. The respondent failed to perform his part of the contract and, therefore, the petitioner filed a suit bearing Civil suit No. 9-A of 1978 in the court of ADJ, Mandleshwar. The trial court granted a decree for specific performance on 18/11/1987 directing the respondent to refund the earnest money of Rs. 15,000. 00 and also damages quantified in the sum of Rs. 2,000. 00, as agreed in the contract, within a period of three months and in default to execute the sale deed. The respondent filed applications to rescind the decree in execution and he sought extension of time for compliance. The executing court by order dated 15/3/1996 allowed both the applications of the respondent and directed him to deposit the amount within three days from that date. In revision, the High court, while upholding that order, has, in addition to the direction of the lower court, directed the respondent to deposit a further sum of Rs. 16,000. 00 to compensate the petitioner for loss of enjoyment of money. Thus, this special leave petition.

(3.) Shri R. S. Suri, the learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that in view of the inordinate delay of 7 1/2 years in making the application and in view of the finding given by the executing court that no proper explanation was given by the respondent for the delay, the execution court as well as the high court committed an error of law in directing extension of time there being no proper explanation. The High court also was wrong in its conclusion that the decree can be treated to be a preliminary decree and, therefore, the direction can be granted in the final decree. It is also contended that the court has no power to extend time. We do not find force in any of these contentions. It is seen that sub-section (1 of Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short "the Act") gives right to the judgment-debtor to file an application to rescind the contract. It reads as under: