TOTA RAM Vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This special leave petition arises from the judgment of the High court of Allahabad, made on 19-11-1996 in Writ Petition No. 12843 of 1994

(2.) Admittedly, on reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short "the Act") , the reference court passed its award and decree on 18/5/1990. The petitioner filed an application under Section 28-A of the Act on 22/7/1992 staling that he came to know on 19-7-1992 that in another reference compensation for the lands had been enhanced and claimed compensation at the said enhanced rates as he had filed application under proviso to Section 28-A of the Act within three months of his knowledge. The Collector as well as the High court have negatived the contention. The question that arises for consideration is whether the limitation for the purpose of application under Section 28-A of the Act begins to start from the date of the knowledge. Section 28-A reads as under:

(3.) A reading thereof clearly indicates that a person whose land is acquired under a common notification issued under Section 4 (1 of the Act but who failed to avail of the remedy of reference under Section 18, iseligible to make a written application within three months from the date of the award of the court enhancing the compensation. It has been interpreted by this court that the "court" means court of Original Civil Jurisdiction to whom reference under Section 18 would lie. Admittedly, the award of the reference court having been made on 18/5/1990, the limitation began to run from that date. The proviso to Section 28-A gives a right to the persons to obtain the certified copy of the award and decree and the time taken for obtaining the certified copy of the award and the decree shall be excluded in computing the period of three months. In view of the express language, the question of knowledge does not arise and, therefore, the plea of the petitioner that the limitation of three months begins to start from the date of the knowledge is clearly unsustainable and cannot be accepted. The High court, therefore, is right in its decision in that behalf