LAWS(SC)-1997-3-19

MADANLAL SETHI Vs. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

Decided On March 27, 1997
MADANLAL SETHI Appellant
V/S
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Leave granted in SLP (C) No. 2104/93. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

(2.) These appeals by special leave arise from the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, made on 29-1-1986 and 14-11-1992 in M. P. No. 2017 and M. P. No. 3764/92.

(3.) The primary question in this case relates to the validity of the Madhya Pradesh Kashtha Chiran (Viniyaman) Adhiniyam, 1984 (for short, the Act) and Rule 27 of the M. P. (Transit (forest Produce) Rules, 1961 (for short, the Rules). The appellants have challenged the validity of the above provisions of the Act and the Rules on the ground that they requires them to maintain proper records and duly enter in the register certain specifications of the forest wood purchased by them under public auction from the Government timber depots. After sawing and cutting the wood into different sizes, the appellants are required to make proper entries into the relevant register. When the consumers take out of the wood from the timber depot, they are also required to submit a transit permit. Thereby they have been made accountable to give particulars of the forest wood they purchase from the respective Government depots. It is stated that the licensees of the saw mills are being unnecessarily harassed by being asked to make numerous needless entries in the relevant register, like Forms D-1 and D-2 and there by getting subjected to confiscation of the wood lawfully purchased by them. It is stated that this cumbersome process hinders their business. The prescription of the details required of them also impinges upon, and restricts their business. Thus, it is claimed that the Act and the Rules are arbitrary and unreasonable as they offend their fundamental right of freedom to carry on the business and trade under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The Division Bench, it is argued, has not correctly appreciated the grievance of the appellants. When the matter had come up for consideration before us in the first instance, by order dated December 19, 1996, we observed as under: