(1.) These appeals by special leave are directed against a judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dated December 20, 1984 reversing the judgment and order of a learned single Judge dated March 27, 1979 and allowing the writ petition filed by respondent No. 1 herein Thiru Chaturvedi Badrinath, a senior member of the Indian Administrative Service, and directing the issuance of a writ of mandamus ordaining the State Government of Tamil Nadu from granting the requisite permission of the Government under R. 17 of the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968 for the institution of a suit for damages for defamation by him against respondent No. 2 Thiru V. Karthikeyan, the then Chief Secretary to the State Government of Tamil Nadu by a defamatory statement that he, allegedly, made to a correspondent of the Indian Express against him.
(2.) The facts. At the relevant time, respondent No. 1 Thiru Badrinath was the Commissioner of Archives and Historical Research, Tamil Nadu. On September 7, 1973 he delivered a speech at a function held by the History Association of the Presidency College, Madras criticising the time capsule buried in the precincts of the Red Fort at Delhi and said that it was full of distortions of historical facts describing it as 'neither history nor fiction'. This led to a furore both in Parliament as well as in the national press. The Government feeling greatly embarrassed by the controversy created about the authenticity of the time capsule, started disciplinary inquiry against respondent No. 1 under Rr. 6 and 7 of the All India Services (Conduct) Rules on the view that being a civil servant it was not desirable that he should have participated in a public discussion on the time capsule. However, the State, Government by a G.O. dated August 25, 1977 dropped the disciplinary proceedings. Just a day before i.e. on August 24, 1977 a signed news item appeared in all the editions of the Indian Express about the controversy regarding the time capsule stating that a Government spokesman charged respondent No. 1 as trying to 'sabotage the civil services from within' . Taking umbrage at the offending utterance, respondent No. 1 addressed a letter dated August 25, 1977 expressing his anguish that such a statement was made by a Government spokesman, and desired to know as to who that Government spokesman was; and whether he indeed uttered the words and if so, whether that reflected the views of the Government. On the same day, respondent No. 2 in his capacity as the Chief Secretary replied that he had no information to communicate to him on the subject. On December 5, 1977 respondent No. 1 addressed another letter to respondent No. 2 in the form of a representation complaining of the defamatory attack on him demanding that the Government should issue a contradiction through the press. The Government did not accede to the demand. In the meanwhile, respondent No. 1 apparently addressed a letter to a certain Shastri Ramachandran, the press correspondent of the Indian Express, asking him to disclose the name of the Government spokesman. The correspondent by his letter dated December 14, 1977 informed that the Government spokesman was respondent No. 2 who during a telephonic conversation with him had made the offending utterance. There were certain other utterances attributed to respondent No. 2 with which we are not concerned. Upon this, respondent No. 1 by his letter dated December 19, 1977 sought permission to meet the Chief Minister and personally place before him his grievances set out in his aforesaid representation. The grievance of respondent No. 1 is that the letter was never replied to.
(3.) Eventually, on December 28, 1977 respondent No. 1 applied for sanction of the Government under R. 17 of the Rules seeking permission to institute a suit against respondent No. 2 for damages for defamation. This was sought on the ground. that in an interview with Thiru Shastri Ramachandran, the correspondent of the Indian Express, respondent No. 2 had charged him with trying to sabotage the civil services from within and that the charge was per se defamatory and was made with intent to bring disrepute to his career as a scholar and historian and caused irreparable damage to his reputation as a civil servant. By the impugned G.O. dated February 7, 1978 the Government refused to grant the permission applied for to respondent No. 1. Against the refusal respondent No. 1 moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for the issuance of a writ of mandamus and other appropriate writs, directions and orders. A learned single Judge (V. Ramaswami. J.) by his judgment and order dated January 23, 1979 dismissed the writ petition on the ground that respondent No. 1 was not entitled to grant of the requisite permission under R. 17 of the Rules as a matter of course and it could, not be said that the refusal of the Government to grant such permission was arbitrary, capricious or on irrelevant consideration. On the contrary, he held that the Government refusal was based on proper grounds inasmuch as the Government had taken into account all the relevant considerations including public interest and the interest of maintenance of discipline in the civil service. The learned single Judge further observed that public interest was certainly a proper ground on which the Government could refuse the permission, if they were of the view that grant of such permission would expose another officer to unnecessary harassment through vexatious proceedings or encourage feud among civil servants and that had to be prevented. Aggrieved, respondent No. 2 preferred an appeal under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. A Division Bench (M. N. Chandurkar, C.J. and Sathiadev, J.) by its judgment and order dated December 20, 1984 allowed the appeal holding that the refusal of the State Government to grant the requisite permission under R. 17 of the Rules could not be justified on the ground of public interest. The entire judgment of the Division Bench proceeds on the wrongful hypothesis that the obtaining of prior permission of the Government under R. 17 was a condition precedent for the maintainability of a suit for damages. It also manifestly erred in its view that the speech delivered by respondent No. 1 at the function was in his official capacity as the Commissioner of Archives and Historical Research and therefore the intended suit fell within the ambit of R. 17 of the Rules inasmuch as it was a suit for the vindication of an official act. We are afraid, it is difficult to sustain the judgment of the Division Bench.