(1.) This appeal by Special Leave is against the appellate order of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court. Respondent No. 1 was appointed to the Indian Police Service on 4-7-1969 and has been discharged by the impugned order dated 9-4-1974. After he was appointed by the Union of India he was allotted to the State cadre of Gujarat and the order of discharge has been made on the basis of steps taken by the State of Gujarat. The order of discharge was assailed by filing a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The single Judge annulled the order. To the writ petition both the Union of India and the State of Gujarat were party-respondents. Against the single Judge's decision, two appeals were preferred to the Division Bench. The Division Bench for reasons mostly different from what had been recorded by the learned single Judge, came to the same conclusion. Before this Court, there is only one appeal by the State of Gujarat and the Union of India has been joined as a respondent. Initially a preliminary objection had been raised regarding the maintainability of the appeal in the absence of any appeal by the Union of India but Mr. Kacker appearing for respondent No. 1 has given up the same. It is, therefore, not necessary to go into that question. The order of discharge read as follows :
(2.) The other aspect which has been canvassed before us at length is as to whether the respondent should have been treated as a confirmed officer of the cadre at the time the order of discharge was made. Admittedly, the order of discharge is about five years after the appointment.
(3.) Rule 3(1) of the Indian Police Service (Probation) Rules, 1954 provides that every person recruited to the service in accordance with Indian Police Service (Appointment by Competitive Examination) Regulations, 1955, .....shall be appointed to the service on probation for a period of two years. At the relevant time, sub-rule (3) of the said Rules provided that the Central Government may, if it so thinks fit in any case or class of cases extend the period of probation. Admittedly, in this case there was no order of extension. It has been contended that no order of extension is necessary to be made as the process of confirmation is not automatic and even if the two-year period as provided in Rule 3(1) has expired confirmation would not ipso facto follow and a special order has to be made.