LAWS(SC)-1987-9-22

D SATYAJNARAYANA Vs. P JAGADISH

Decided On September 15, 1987
D.SATYAJNARAYANA Appellant
V/S
P.JAGADISH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal by special leave. brought from the judgment and order of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dated August 21, 1986 raises a question of general importance. The High Court has upheld the judgment of the Chief Judge, City Small Cause Court dated April 29, 1985 directing the eviction of the appellant from the demised premises under S. 10(2)(vi) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. The question is whether the appellant was estopped from denying the title of the lessor under S. 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872 despite the fact that there was threat of eviction by the owner of the demised premises one Krishnamurthy i.e. the person having title paramount.

(2.) There is no material point of fact which is now in dispute. The demised premises which is a removable wooden cabin or kiosk located at one corner of a building belonging to one Krishnamurthy was let out on a rent of Rs. 6 per day which later was increased to Rs. 10, by the respondent P. Jagadish, son of the original tenant P.R.N. Upadhyaya on March 9, 1977. Admittedly, the main premises i.e. the building was demised by Krishnamurthy to the said P. R. N. Upadhyaya in the year 1972 and in course of time he had sublet different portions of the premises to different persons. By a notice dated November 8, 1980 the head lessor Krishnamurthy served a notice of eviction on the appellant and other subtenants alleging that there was unlawful subletting by the lessee and that he had decided to terminate the tenancy of the tenant Upadhyaya with the expiry of that month i.e. by the end of December 1980. Thereupon. the appellant on December 4, 1980 was constrained to attorn in favour of the original lessor Krishnamurthy agreeing to pay him a rent of Rs. 300 per month. Evidently, the appellant had paid rent to the respondent up to March 31, 1980. After becoming a direct tenant under the head lessor Krishnamurthy, the appellant stopped paying rent to the respondent w.e.f. April 1, 1980. On March 13, 1981 the respondent asserting to be the lessor commenced proceedings for eviction of the appellant from the demised premises under Ss. 10(2)(i) and (vi) and 10(3)(b)(iii) of the Act i.e. on the ground that the appellant was in wilful default in payment of rent, that there was denial of title on his part and for his bona fide requirement. The First Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad by order dated November 3, 1982 disallowed the application on the ground that the respondent not being the lessor had no locus standi to initiate the proceedings for eviction. On appeal, the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad by judgment dated April 29, 1985 reversed the order of the learned Rent Controller and directed the eviction of the appellant under S. 10(2)(i) and (vi) holding that the premises in question was a building within S. 2(iii) of the Act and that in view of the denial of his title as well as admitted non-payment of rent, the appellant was estopped from denying the title. That decision of his has been upheld by a learned single Judge of the High Court by the judgment under appeal. The judgment of the High Court mainly rests on the rule of estoppel.

(3.) The appeal must be allowed on the short ground that there being a threat of eviction by a person claiming title paramount i.e. head lessor Krishnamurthy, the appellant was not estopped under S. 116 of the Evidence Act from challenging the title and his right to maintain the eviction proceedings of the respondent P. Jagadish as the lessor. S. 116 of the Evidence Act provides that no tenant of immovable property shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property. Possession and permission being established, estoppel would bind the tenant during the continuance of the tenancy and until he surrenders his possession. The words "during the continuance of the tenancy" have been interpreted to mean during the continuance f the possession that was received under the tenancy in question, and the Courts have repeatedly laid down that estoppel operates even after the termination of the tenancy so that a tenant who had been let into possession, however, defective it may be, so long as he has not openly surrendered possession. cannot dispute the title of the landlord at the commencement of the tenancy. The rule of estoppel is thus restricted not only in extent but also in time i.e. restricted to the title of the landlord and during the continuance of the tenancy, and by necessary implication, it follows that a tenant is not estopped, when he is under threat of eviction by the title paramount, from contending that the landlord had no title before the tenancy commenced or that the title of the landlord has since come to an end.