STATE OF GUJARAT Vs. SANKALCHAND KHODIDAS PATEL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal by the defendant State of Gujarat and another against the appellate judgment and decree of the Gujarat High Court dated February 17/18, 1972:(ILR (1973) Guj 378) on a certificate under Art. 133 (1) (b) of the Constitution as its stood before the Constitution (Thirtieth Amendment) Act, 1972.

(2.) The case arose on a suit instituted by the plaintiff Sankalchand Khodidas Patel on 8-2-1961, to challenge the validity of the notifications issued by the defendant State under Ss. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in respect of land bearing survey number 146, in Dariapur-Kajipur area of Ahmedabad city. The notification under S. 4 was issued on May 23, 1958, in respect of 1 acre 36 gunthas of land. It was stated in the notification that the land was likely to be needed for a "public purpose, viz., for the constructing of houses for New Sarvodaya Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., at Dariapur-Kazipur, Ahmedabad." An erratum was issued on August 20, 1959, by which it was further clarified that the land was required for "providing housing facilities of New Sarvodaya Co-operative Housing Society, Ltd., for Backward Class peopel at Dariapur-Kazipur, Ahmedabad." The notification under S. 6 of the Act was issued on August 13, 1960, in which it was declared, inter alia, that the land was required for the "public purpose" specified in column 4 of the Schedule, namely, for providing housing facilities for the Backward Class people referred to above. The plaintiff prayed for a declaration that the notifications were illegal and null and void, and for a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants and their agents etc. from taking possession of the land or disturbing the plaintiff"s possession.

(3.) The defendant traversed the claim in the plaint and specifically pleaded that the acquisition was for a public purpose and that it had (as the acquiring body) "agreed to pay the amount of compensation when asked for to the plaintiff". The City Civil Judge dismissed the suit by his judgment dated March 1, 1966. The High Court however allowed the plaintiff"s appeal, set aside the trial court"s decree, declared the notification under S. 6 of the act to be bad in law and void, and perpetually restrained the defendants from enforcing the notification and from taking any further steps in pursuance thereof. This is why the State has come up in appeal to this Court.