B SHAH Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER LABOUR COURT COIMBATORE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal by special leave which is directed against the judgment and order dated April 24, 1974 of the Letters Patent Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Madras reversing the judgment and order dated April 19, 1971 of the Singe Judge of that Court passed in writ petition No. 3822 of 1969 presented under Art. 226 of the Constitution raises a complex but an interesting question relating to the construction of the phrase "maternity benefit ... ... ... ... ... ... for the period of her actual absence immediately preceding and including the day of her delivery and for the six weeks immediately following that day" occurring in S. 5 (1) of the Maternity Benefits Act, 1961 (Act LIII of 1961) (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") which in view of S. 2 (1) of the Act is the law applicable even to women workers employed in plantations.

(2.) It appears that in October, 1967, Subbammal, respondent No. 2 herein, who is woman worker employed in Mount Stuart Estate (hereinafter referred to as "the establishment"), which is carrying on plantation industry, was allowed leave of absence by the establishment on the basis of a notice given by her of her expected delivery which actually took place on December 16, 1967. After her delivery, the respondent was paid by her employers on account of maternity benefit an amount equivalent to what she would have earned on the basis of her average daily wage in 72 working days falling within twelve weeks of the maternity period. While calculating the aforesaid amount of maternity benefit, the establishment admittedly excluded twelve Sundays being wageless holidays, which fell during the period of the respondent"s actual absence immediately preceding and including the day of her delivery and the six weeks immediately following that day. Dissatisfied with this computation, the respondent made a representation to her employers claiming maternity benefit for the entire period of twelve weeks under the Act i.e. for 84 days on the plea that a week consisted of seven days. As her demand did not evoke a favourable response, the respondent applied to the Labour Court, Coimbatore, under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for redress of her grievance. The claim preferred by the respondent was resisted by the appellant herein who contended that the respondent was admittedly working and was being paid only for six days in a week and that a pregnant woman worker is entitled to maternity benefit for 72 days which are the normal working days in twelve weeks and not for 84 days, as no wage is payable for the seventh day of the week i.e. Sunday, which is a non-working wageless holiday. By its order dated February 26, 1969, the Labour Court allowed the claim of the respondent. Thereupon the establishment moved the High Court at Madras under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the decision of the Labour Court contending that the claim made by the respondent was untenable as normally a worker works only for six days in a week and the maternity benefit had to be computed only for 72 days. As against this, the respondent pleaded that the computation had to be made not with reference to the actual number of working days but with reference to total number of days covered by twelve weeks i.e. 84 days. The Single Judge of the High Court to whom the case was assigned allowed the petition holding that twelve weeks for which maternity benefit is provided for in sub-s. (3) of S. 5 of the Act must be taken to mean twelve weeks of work and the computation of the benefit had to be made with reference to the actual days on which the woman would have worked but for her inability. Aggrieved by this decision, the respondent filed an appeal under Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent which, as already stated, was allowed by the Letters Patent Bench of the High Court observing that the maternity benefit which the respondent was entitled to receive was for the period of her absence before delivery including the day of delivery and also six weeks thereafter, each week consisting of seven days including Sundays. Dissatisfied with this decision, the establishment has, as already stated, come up in appeal to this Court by special leave.

(3.) We have heard Mr. Pai, learned counsel for the appellant as also Mr. Bhatt, who in view of the default in appearance of respondent No. 2 and the importance of the point involved in the case was appointed as amicus curiae. We place on record our deep appreciation of the valuable assistance rendered to us by both of them.