NARENDRA MADIVALAPA KHENI Vs. MANIKRAO PATIL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Four heavy volumes of case records confronted us in this appeal, as counsel opened the arguments, but some socratic processing seemed to condense the controversy and forensic prolixity so much so we, first thought the case had shrunk to such small dimensions as to be disposed of in a short judgment. But what we initially felt, when the brief narration of facts was given, proved a snare. For, when we read out in court our opinion on the only crucial aspect of the case, counsel for the 1st respondent hopefully insisted that the factual grounds, requiring our Ploughing through ponderous temes of testimenial collection, pleadings and what not, should be investigated as he expected to sustain the invalidation of the election by the High Court on the score of corrupt practice and the consequential disqualification of the rival candidate i. e., the appellant before us. He was entitled to press that part of his case and so we agreed to hear both sides extensively thereon.

(2.) However, hours of argument after, we were back to square one. At this stage, some relevant facts and circumstances need narration. The Karnataka Legislative Council has, in its composition, some members elected from the local authorities constituencies. One such member is elected by the local bodies of Bidar district and the specific election that falls for decision was held on May 12, 1974. According to the calendar for the poll contemplated in Sec. 30 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter called the 1951 Act), the last date for presenting the nominations was appointed as April 17, 1974. Section 33 (1) requires that each candidate shall deliver to the returning officer a nomination paper as set out in the section between 11 oclock in the forenoon and 3 oclock in the afternoon. The appellant and the first respondent did file their nominations in conformity with the law; their scrutiny over, they entered the fray and, after the poll was over, the appellant was declared elected, having secured 64 votes as against the 1st respondent's 54 votes. The frustrated 1st respondent found 16 illegitimate votes having been cast in favour of the successful candidate and further discovered that these 16 electors were ineligible to figure on the electoral roll but had been surreptitiously introduced therein by collusion, fraud and other improper machinations in which the returned candidate and the returning officer were collaborative actors. The purity of the election was polluted. The result of the poll was materially affected. The electoral process was vitiated by corrupt practice in which the appellant and the 2nd respondent were particeps criminis. He ventured on an election petition with the prayer to set aside the poll verdict inter alia under Section 123 (7) of the 1951 Act and also sought a declaration that he was duly elected on the score that the exclusion of the invalid votes, very probably cast in favour of the appellant, led inevitably to his arithmetical success as the one who had secured the larger number of valid votes. Such was his case.

(3.) The petitioner had made some-what vague, sweeping and speculative allegations about government, higher and lower echelons of officialdom and the rival candidate but, if an apology for specificity is partially present in the petition, it is about the charge of corrupt practice roping in the returning officer-cum-electoral registering officer (2nd respondent) and the successful candidate (appellant). No issue was originally framed on the critical question of corrupt practice but the learned Judge permitted evidence thereon to be adduced - a procedure difficult to appreciate. After the trial was virtually closed and the arguments finished, the Court discovered the need for framing this decisive issue. On objection as to the absence of material facts and/or material particulars, the learned Judge framed an issue also on the actual vagueness and legal flawsomeness of pleadings on corrupt practice. Naturally, this latter question demanded prior decision but, curiously, the Court delivered all its findings on the day of judgment, a faux pas which we must point out. Processual proprieties are designed to ensure fair play in adjudications and while such prescriptions are not rigid punctilios, their observance serves to help the Judge do effective justice between parties and the disputants have faith in the intelligent impartiality and full opportunity so necessary for the success of the rule of law. In election proceedings where the whole community is silently present and the controversy is sensitive and feelings suspicious, the principles of procedural rectitude apply a fortiori. The judge is the guardian of processual justice and must remember that judgment on judgment belongs, in the long run, to the people. We state this stern proposition here not merely because a forensic stitch in time saves cassational nine but because courts are on continuous trial in a democracy. In this case we are not satisfied that either party has suffered in substance and procedural breaches, unless they spell unmerited prejudice, may be brushed aside at the appellate level.