HIRALAL MALLICK Vs. STATE OF BIHAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal involves an issue of criminal culpability presenting mixed questions of fact and law and a theme of jnvenile justice a criminological cinderella of the Indian law-in-action.

(2.) Hiralal Mallick, the sole appellant before us, was a 12 years old lad when he toddled into crime conjointly with his two elder brothers. The three, together, were charged with the homicide of one Arjan Mallick which ended in a conviction of all under S. 302 read with Section 34, I. P. C. The trial Judge impartially imposed on each one a punishment of imprisonment for life. On appeal by all three, the High Court, taking note of the some peculiarities, directed the conversion of the convictions from S. 302 (read with Section 34) into one under S. 326 (read with S. 34) I. P. C. and, consequently, pared down the punishment awarded to the co-accused into rigorous imprisonment for 8 years. The third accused, the appellant before us, was shown consideration for his tender age of 12 years (at the time of commission of the crime) and the Court, in a mood of compassion, softened the sentence of the boy into rigorous imprisonment for 4 years.

(3.) A close-up of the participatory role of the youthful offender, as distinguished from that of his elder brothers discloses a junior partnership for him. For, argued Shri Goburdhun, while accused 1 and 2 caused the fatal stabs, the appellant was found to have inflicted superficial cuts on the victim with a sharp weapon, probably angered by the episode of an earlier attack on their father, induced by the stress of the reprisal urge and spurred by his brothers' rush after the foe, but all the same definitely helping them in their aggression. That he was too infantine to understand the deadly import of the sword blows he delivered is obvious that he inflicted lesser injuries of a superficial nature is proved; that he, like the other two, chased and chopped and took to his heels, is evident. The immature age of the offender, the fraternal company which circumstanced in his involvement the degree of intent guaged by the depth of the wounds he caused and the other facts surrounding the occurrence, should persuade us to hold that this juvenile was guilty - not of death dealing brutality - but of naughty criminality in a violent spree. Measured by his intent and infancy, his sinister part in the macabre offence ran upto infliction of injury with a cutting weapon attracting S. 324, I. P. C. not more. Such was the macaronic submission of counsel anxious to press for an extenuatory exoneration from incarceration.