SARDAR IQBAL SINGH Vs. STATE DELHI ADMINISTRATION

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal by special leave is directed against an order of the Delhi High Court refusing to quash a proceeding pending against the appellant in the Court of the Special Judge, Delhi.

(2.) On or about November 28, 1973 a charge-sheet against the appellant and two others was filed before the Special Judge, Tis Hazari, Delhi, alleging facts constituting offences punishable under S. 120-B Indian Penal Code read with Ss. 161 and 165-A of the Indian Penal Code and S. 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. One Martin Joseph Fernandez had been arrested in connection with the case when it was at the stage of investigation. He was produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Delhi, who tendered a pardon to him under S. 337 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as the Code). On December 12, 1975 the appellant applied to the Special Judge for quashing the proceeding for want of sanction under Section 197 of the Code and also on the ground of failure to examine the said Martin Joseph Fernandez as a witness as required by sub-sections (2) and (2-B) of S. 337 of the Code. The Special Judge having dismissed the application, the appellant moved the Delhi High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution and S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for setting aside the order passed by the Special Judge and quashing the proceeding. On September 10, 1976 the High Court dismissed the appellant's petition and upheld the order of the Special Judge rejecting the prayer for quashing the proceeding.

(3.) Mr. A. K. Sen appearing for the appellant has not pressed the ground of want of sanction and has confined his argument to the other ground. His contention is that once a pardon has been tendered to a person at the stage of the investigation under S. 337 (1) of the Code, the provision of S. 8 (1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 empowering a Special Judge to take cognizance of offences without the accused being committed to him for trial, ceases to apply and the chargesheet in such a case must be filed before a competent Magistrate. It is argued that in such a case letting the Special Judge take cognizance of the offence under S. 8 (1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act would make the provision discriminatory offending Article 14 of the Constitution. The argument is built on Sub-sec. (2-B) of S. 337 of the Code under which the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence has to examine the approver as a witness before sending the case for trial to the Court of the Special Judge.