BHAGABANDAS AGARWALLA Vs. BHAGWANDAS KANU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal by special leave raises a short question relating to the validity of a notice to quit given by the appellant terminating the tenancy of the respondents. The appellant, as landlord, filed a suit for eviction against the respondents as tenants, after giving a notice to quit dated 25th September, 1962. The trial Court dismissed the suit but on appeal, the First Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial Court and passed a decree of eviction against the respondents. The respondents preferred a second appeal to the High Court and the only question debated before the High Court was in regard to the validity of the notice to quit. There were two grounds on which the notice to quit was assailed as invalid. The first is immaterial since the decision of the High Court negativing it has not been challenged before us on behalf of the respondents. The second was that the notice to quit was invalid as it was not in conformity with the requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. That section says that in the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease from month to month shall be terminable "on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy." The argument of the respondents before the High Court was that the notice to quit did not expire with the end of the month of the tenancy and was hence invalid. This argument found favour with the High Court and it held that the notice to quit was not clear and unambiguous and was "open to doubt as to the date of determination of the tenancy" and did not terminate the tenancy on the expiration of the month of the tenancy and was, therefore, invalid and in this view it dismissed the suit of the appellant. The appellant thereupon preferred the present appeal with special leave obtained from this Court.

(2.) The only question which arises for determination in this appeal is whether the notice to quit given by the appellant to the respondents was invalid as not being in conformity with the requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The notice to quit, so far as material, was in the following terms:

(3.) Now, it is settled law that a notice of quit must be construed not with a desire to find faults in it, which would render it defective, but it must be construed but resmagis valeat quam pereat. "The validity of a notice to quit", as pointed out by the Lord Justice Lindely, L.J. in Side botham v. Holland,(1895) 1 QB 378 "ought not to turn on the splitting of a straw". It must not be read in a hyper-critical manner, nor must its interpretation be affected by pedagogic pendantism or over refined subtlety, but it must be construed in a common sence way. See Hariahar Banerji v. Ramsashi Roy, 45 Ind App 222 . The notice to quit in the present case must be judged for its validity in the light of this well recognised principle of interpretation.