S SANYAL Vs. GIAN CHAND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant Miss Sanyal has since 1942 been a tenant of a house in Western Extension Area Karol Bagh, New Delhi, a part of which is used for a Girls' School and the rest for residential purposes. The respondent Gian Chand purchased the house from the owners by a sale deed dated September 19, 1956, and commenced an action in the Court of the Subordinate Judge Ist Class, Delhi against the appellant for a decree in ejectment in respect of the house. Numerous grounds were set up in the plaint in support of the claim for a decree in ejectment, but the ground that the respondent required the house bona fide for his own residence alone need be considered in this appeal. The Trial Court dismissed the suit and the Senior Subordinate Judge, Delhi dismissed an appeal from that order holding that the house being let for purposes nonresidential as well as residential, a degree in ejectment could not be granted under Section 18 (1) (e) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. The High Court of Punjab (Delhi Bench) in a revision petition filed by the respondent held that on the finding recorded by the First Appellate Court a decree in ejectment limited to that portion of the house which was used for residential purposes by the tenant could be granted, and remanded the case to the Rent Controller "for demarcating those portions which were being used for residence" and to pass a decree in ejectment from those specific portions of the house. Against that order the tenant has appealed to this Court.

(2.) It is necessary in the first instance to read the material provisions of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. The expression premises" is defined in Section 2 (g) of the Act as "any building or part of a building which is, or is intended to be let separately for use as a residence or for commercial use or for any other purpose, and includes * * * Section 18 of the Act which grants protection to tenants against eviction provides insofar as it is material:

(3.) In the present case the First Appellate Court held that the house was "let out for running a school and for residence." The High Court held that where there is a composite letting, it is open to the Court to disintegrate the contract of tenancy, and if the landlord proves his case of bona fide requirement for his own occupation to pass a decree in ejectment limited to that part which "is being used" by the tenant for residential purposes. In 90 holding, in our judgment, the High Court erred. The jurisdiction of the Court may be exercised under Section 13 (1) (e) of the Act only when the premises are let for residential purposes and not when the premises being let for composite purposes, are used in specific portions for purposes residential and non-residential. The contract of tenancy is a single and indivisible contract, and in the absence of any statutory provision to that effect it is not open to the Court to divide it into two contracts-one of letting for residential purposes, and the other for non-residential purposes, and to grant relief under Sec. 13(1) (e) of the Act limited to the portion of the demised property which "is being used" for residential purposes.