UNION OF INDIA Vs. JUBBI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The Himachal Pradesh State legislature passed the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on June 17, 1953 and the Act was brought into force with effect from January 26, 1955. The validity of the Act was thereafter successfully impugned (cf. Shri Vinod Kumar vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1959) 1 Suppl. SCR 160. The Parliament then passed the Validating Act, 56 of 1958. That Act was itself then challenged in Jadab Singh vs. Himachal Pradesh Administration, (1960) 3 SCR 755 but the challenge was rejected and the Act since then remains on the statute book as a valid piece of legislation.

(2.) On June 4, 1959 the respondent made an application under S. 11 of the Act for acquiring proprietary rights in the lands set out therein claiming to be the cultivating tenant of those lands and produced a copy of Jamabandhi in support of his claim. He stated that he was the tenant of the Union of India in respect of the said lands, that he was cultivating the said lands, that he was paying Rs. 35/5/- annually as rent and Rs. 23/8/- as annual land revenue and other rates and cesses assessed on the said lands and that he was willing to pay compensation as provided by the Act. On November 26, 1959 the Forest Department on behalf of the Union filed objections alleging that the application was incompetent, that the said lands formed part of the protected forest, that the relationship between the respondent and the Union was not that of landlord and tenant, that the Union being the paramount owner could not be characterised as landlord qua the respondent, that a number of trees stood on the said lands, that the respondent was merely a lessee of the said lands which were a forest area, that the entries in the revenue record in respect of the said lands were incorrect and could not be relied on in an application under Section 11 and consequently the Compensation Officer, Mahasu, had no jurisdiction to grant. The Compensation Officer held that the said area was not a forest area that there were no trees on the said lands as alleged and that since the respondent was mentioned as an occupancy tenant in the Jamabandhi he was entitled to proprietary rights in the said ends on his paying compensation which he fixed at Rs. 76.40nP. The Forest Department thereupon filed an appeal before the District Judge, Mahasu, principally on the ground that the Compensation Officer had not followed the procedure laid down in the Act and had not given to the Forest Department reasonable opportunity to put for ward its case. The Forest Department did not dispute in the said appeal that the appellant held the said lands as a tenant of the Government. On July 26, 1960 the District Judge allowed the appeal and remanded the case to the Compensation Officer directing him to raise proper issues and decide the matter in accordance with law. Accordingly, the Compensation Officer raised four issues, viz., whether there were trees on the said lands, whether the lands formed part of the forest, whether the respondent was a tenant in respect of the said lands and whether there was any impediment in the way of granting proprietary rights to him. The Compensation Officer held that the respondent was a tenant, that there was no impediment in granting proprietary rights to him and allowed once again the respondents application. The appeal by the Union against the said order before the District Judge failed. The District Judge held that the respondent' was the tenant of the Union and that the Act applied to the said lands as also to the Union. The Union filed a Second Appeal before the Judicial Commissioner challenging the correctness of the District Judge's said order. Both the Compensation Officer and the District Judge having held on the strength of the Jamabandhi that the respondent was the occupancy tenant in respect of the said lands, the only questions raised in the Second Appeal were (1) that the Act did not bind the Union or the State Government and (2) that the respondent's application under S. 11 could not lie against the Union in respect of lands owned by it. The Judicial Commissioner followed the ratio laid down in Director of Rationing and Distribution vs. Corporation of Calcutta, (1961) 1 SCR 158 which was the law then prevailing and in view of that decision posed the question whether the Act applied to and was binding on the Union. He held that though the Act did not contain any express provision to that effect, an examination of Sections 11, 15, 27 and 54 showed that the Act applied to Government land and was by necessary implication binding on the Union. He observed that the object of the Act and the acquisition of right, title and interest of the land owner in the land of any tenancy held under him by a tenant was that such interest should ultimately be transferred to the tenant. He held that on a consideration of the relevant provisions of the Act "the conclusion to which I have been driven is that by necessary implication the Act binds the Government and an application under Section 11 of the Act by a tenant is competent in respect of land held by him under the Government." In that view he dismissed the Union's appeal. The Union of India filed this appeal after obtaining certificate under Art. 133(1) (c) of the Constitution. After this appeal had gone on for some time we felt that as it involved a question of some public importance it was desirable that we should have the assistance of some senior counsel. We accordingly directed the Registrar to appoint a Senior Counsel amicus curiae. Accordingly, Mr. D. R. Prem appeared before us. We gratefully acknowledge the assistance rendered by him.

(3.) Mr. Ganapathy Iyer for the Union of India took us through the different provisions of the Act and submitted that considering the scheme and the object of the Act the conclusion was inescapable that the legislature while enacting the Act did not intend that it should apply to the Government or to lands owned by the Government. To appreciate the contention it is necessary to examine some of the provisions of the Act. but before we do that it would be expedient to clear the ground regarding the question of the applicability of statutes on the State and its immunity, if any, from such statutes.