BALDEO SINGH Vs. STATE OF BIHAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal by special leave from an order of summary dismissal passed by the High Court of Patna on 20th July 1954, on an application under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The relevant facts are these. One Uma Shankar Prasad instituted a case against eight persons, including the three appellants before us, Baldeo Singh, Ramdeo Singh and Sheodhar Singh, on the allegation that they had forcibly cut and removed 'urad' and 'kodo' crops from his field in village Darwan on 1st October 1953 at about 10 a. m. Uma Shankar said that he objected, but was threatened with assault. The case was instituted before the Gram Cutcherry of Bankat in the district of Champaran, constituted under the provisions of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (Bihar Act 7 of 1948), hereinafter referred to as the Act. Altogether four witnesses were examined in the case, two on behalf of the prosecution and for the accused persons. The defence of some of the accused persons was that the land on which the crops stood belonged to one Yogi Sahni, who had sold it to Sunder Singh, accused, on 25th September 1953. On 28th December 1953, a bench of the Gram Cutcherry acquitted all the accused persons. On 7th January 1954, Uma Shankar Prasad preferred an appeal under S. 67 of the Act. The appeal was heard on 24th June 1954, and the full bench by a majority, with three, dissentient panches, held the three appellants guilty of the offence under S. 379, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced them to imprisonment for fifteen days each. The appellants then moved the High Court of Patna under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution, with the result; stated above. The appellants then moved, this Court and obtained special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution.

(2.) Learned counsel for the appellants has pressed the following contentions before us. His first and for foremost contention is that the Act, by reason of certain provisions contained therein, is discriminatory in nature and offends against Art. 14 of the constitution. It is advisable to set out first those provisions of the Act which, according to learned counsel for the appellants, are discriminatory in character. Section 62 of the Act, which provides for the criminal jurisdiction of Gram Cutcherries, is in these terms:

(3.) The argument of learned counsel for the appellant in that inasmuch as S. 62 gives only concurrent jurisdiction, it leaves it open to a party to go either to the ordinary criminal Courts or to a bench of the Gram Cutcherry. According to him this opens the door for discrimination, because the procedure followed in the ordinary criminal Courts is substantially different from that followed by a Gram Cutcherry. The procedure to be followed by the latter is indicated in S.60 which states: