(1.) The only question for determination in this appeal is whether the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction, has the power to enhance the sentence, as it has done in the instant case, beyond the limit of the maximum sentence that could have been imposed by the trial Court, on the accused persons. The appellants, along with others, were placed on their trial before the Assistant Sessions Judge of Chapra in the district of Saran, for the offence of dacoity under S. 395, Indian Penal Code. They, along with two others, were convicted under S. 395, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 5 years, by the Assistant Sessions Judge, by his judgment and order dated December 12, 1953. The other accused were acquitted. The convicted persons preferred an appeal to the High Court at Patna. The High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, while admitting the appeal, called upon the appellants to show cause why, in the event of their convictions being maintained, their sentence should not be enhanced. The appeal and the rule for enhancement of sentence were heard together by a Division Bench of that Court. The High Court, by its judgment and order dated August 4, 1955, allowed the appeal of two of the appellants and acquitted them but maintained the conviction as against the remaining six appellants. On the question of sentence, the High Court observed that the "offence of dacoity has increased tremendously. It is a very heinous offence as innocent persons, while sleeping in their houses, are attacked and their belongings are taken by force. " the High Court, therefore, was of the opinion that a sentence of five years' rigorous imprisonment was "extremely inadequate". It, therefore, enhanced the sentence to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment in each case. The appellants, six in number, moved this Court and obtained special leave to appeal limited to the question of sentence only, the question being whether the High Court had the jurisdiction to enhance the sentence beyond the limits of the power of the trial Court itself.
(2.) The occurrence of dacoity which is the subject-matter of the charge against the appellants, along with others, took place on the night between July 1 and 2, 1952, in the house of Ranjit Bahadur, a minor. After mid-night, 16 or 17 dacoits, fully armed with various deadly weapons, broke open the main entrance door of the house with an axe. After going into the house, they broke open boxes and tampered with the iron safe, and removed articles worth twenty thousand rupees. The inmates of the house were over-powered. Some of them, slipping out of the house, raised a big fire which is the customary form of alarm raised against the invading crowd of dacoits. On that alarm, a number of people of the village turned up but had not the courage to face the dacoits for fear of being shot. They contended themselves with using brick-bats against the dacoits who made good their escape with their booty. It would, thus, appear that it was a serious occurrence involving the lives and fortunes of the inmates of a house, and naturally, the High Court took a very serious view of the offence.
(3.) In this Court, the learned counsel for the appellants, who appeared amicus curiae, contended, in the first place, that the High Court had exceeded its powers in enhancing the sentence from 5 to 10 years inasmuch as the trial Court itself could not have inflicted a sentence of imprisonment for more than 7 years. Alternatively, he contended that the High Court had not kept in view the dictum of this Court in the case of Bed Raj vs. State of U. P., (1955) 2 SCR 583 (A), while enhancing the sentence against the appellants before it. And lastly, it was contended that in any view of the matter, in the circumstances of this case, the sentence of 10 years' rigorous imprisonment is too severe. In our opinion, there is no substance in any one of these contentions.