(1.) Delay condoned. Leave Granted.
(2.) The judgment dated 14.07.2016 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in R.S.A. No. 1804 of 1990 (O&M) is called in question in this appeal by the original defendant. The brief facts leading to this Appeal are as under:
(3.) Thereafter the respondent filed a suit for declaration that he was a regular employee and for consequential relief of permanent injunction against the appellants from terminating his services. By the judgment dated 20.10.1984 the Trial Court i.e. Learned Senior Sub Judge, Rupnagar dismissed the suit. Thereafter the respondent approached the District Court, Rupnagar by way of first appeal. However, the respondent withdrew the said appeal with liberty to file a fresh suit for challenging the legality and validity of the order of termination dated 22.0198 Thereafter, the respondent filed Civil Suit No. 232 of 7.12.1985 before learned Senior Sub Judge, Rupnagar for declaration that he is entitled to continue in service from 22.01983 and for consequential relief of salary and other emoluments. He also prayed for a declaration that the order of termination of his services dated 22.01983 was illegal, void and is against the principles of natural justice. The learned Senior Sub Judge Rupnagar dismissed the suit on 12.11.1987, which judgment came to be questioned by the respondent by filing Civil Appeal before the learned District Judge, Rupnagar. Learned Additional District Judge, Rupnagar, allowed the Appeal on 11-12.04.1990 and set aside the judgment of the Trial Court dated 12.11.1987. The District Judge held that the respondent should be deemed in continuous service from 22.01983 and was entitled to consequential reliefs as if his services had not been terminated. Being aggrieved by the judgment of the First Appellate Court, the appellants herein filed Regular Second Appeal No. RSA 1804 of 1990 (O&M) before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, which came to be partly allowed on 14.07.2016. The High Court set aside the judgment of the First Appellate Court to a certain extent i.e. in part. The operative portion of the judgment reads thus: