LAWS(SC)-1996-12-164

SUNDER DAS Vs. GAJANANRAO

Decided On December 13, 1996
SUNDER DASS Appellant
V/S
GAJANANRAO Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal on the grant of special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is directed against the judgment and order of a Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in First Appeal No. 2 of 1979, whereby the Division Bench dismissed the First Appeal and confirmed with modification the decree passed by the trial Court against the appellants in Civil Suit No. 13A of 1978, in the Court of learned District Judge, Datia. The facts leading to this appeal shortly stated are as under.

(2.) The appellants are the original defendants against whom respondents Nos. 1 to 3, original plaintiffs, filed the aforesaid suit for a declaration that the registered Sale Deed dated 30th May, 1959, executed by their father, respondent No. 4 in this appeal who was original defendant No. 6 in the suit, in favour of the present appellants is void and inoperative at law and for restoration of the possession of the suit house bearing Municipal No. 1153/1 situated in Rajgarh locality of Datia town in the State of Madhya Pradesh. For the sake of convenience we will refer to the appellants as original contesting defendants and respondents 1 to 3 as plaintiffs in the latter part of this judgment. Respondent No. 4, father of the plaintiffs, was joined as defendant No. 6 in the suit. The case of the plaintiff is that their father original defendant No. 6 had executed registered Sale Deed dated 30th May 1959, conveying the suit house to the contesting defendants for a sum of Rs. 1800/-and delivered possession of the said house to them. According to the plaintiffs the suit house was their ancestral property in which they had got undivided 3/4th interest. That their father, defendant No. 6, had no right to transfer the suit house in favour of the contesting defendants and consequently the said Sale Deed was not binding on them.

(3.) The said suit was contested by the contesting defendants on the ground that the house belonged exclusively to their vendor defendant No. 6 and plaintiffs had no interest therein. It was alternatively contended that even assuming that the suit house was an ancestral house wherein the plaintiffs had undivided interest defendant No. 6, their vendor. had alienated the said house for family necessity and his transaction was binding on the plaintiffs. Defendant No. 6, father of the plaintiffs, on the other hand supported the plaintiffs.