AJAY KRISHAN SHINGHAL Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These appeals by special leave arise from the judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dated October 10, 1978 made in L.P.A. No. 115/75 and batch. The Division Bench consisting of Hon'ble Chief Justice T. V. R. Tatachari and Hon'ble Justice S. Ranganathan, as they then were, in an elaborate judgment rendered by the later running into 129 pages, considered threadbare two questions of law raised for consideration, namely, the validity of the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1 of 1894 (for short, the "Act") acquiring an extent of 3470 acres in Naraina village for public purpose, viz., "Planned Development of Delhi" and secondly, whether the substance of the notification under Section 4(1) was published in the locality as envisaged under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act. The learned Judges have upheld the judgment of the learned single Judge and held that the planned development of Delhi is a public purpose and that, therefore, notification was not beset with any vagueness in the likely need of the land for the said purpose. It also held that the substance of the notification was published in the locality, Naraina. The Division Bench considered elaborately various discrepancies pointed out in compliance of the publication of the substance of the notification as noted in the judgment. Thereafter, it was held that they were satisfied that the substance of the notification was in fact effected as per law.

(2.) The material facts are that notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was published in the Gazette on October 24, 1961. The substance of the notification was published on November 21, 1961. The declaration under Section 6 was published on December 7, 1966 after enquiry under Section 5-A. The first question, therefore, is whether the land was needed or was likely to be needed for public purpose as envisaged under Section 4(1) of the Act

(3.) The contention of Shri Lekhi, learned senior counsel for the appellants, is that the lands situated within the Delhi Cantonment are governed by the provisions of the Cantonment Act, 1924. The land in its jurisdiction is required to be developed as per the provisions contained in that Act and the rules made thereunder. The interim General Plan drawn up for development of Delhi in 1957 and revised Master Plan in 1962 under Delhi Development Act, 1958 (for short, the "Development Act") effective from September 1, 1962 and the further revised Plan 1992 which would be elongated till 2001, do not envisage any development in respect of the acquired land. The Master Plans do indicate that the land use is "undetermined" which would indicate that the land was not itemised to the effect that it was needed for any kind of specified public purpose as required under the Master Plan as per the provisions of the Development Act which requires various steps to be taken thereunder, namely, Master Plan, Regional Plan, Zonal Plan and Zonal Development Plan. In all the steps, there should be specification of the land required for specified public purpose. An elaborate study by a group of experts undertook to demarcate various lands situated at different places for various purposes mentioned in the plans appended thereunder. The land in question was not specifically demarcated for any of the purposes. It would, therefore, be clear that the land is not needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose. Accordingly the acquisition is a colourable exercise of power to deprive the owners of the land. He further contended that, as a fact, there was no publication of the substance of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, in the locality. Publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in the State Gazette and of the substance thereof in the locality are mandatory requirements under Section 4(1) of the Act. Non-compliance thereof renders the entire acquisition void. Three versions on publication of the substance emerge from the record, namely, one, as given and translated by the counsel for the appellants in the High Court; second, as given by the Court translator as was got done by the High Court; and the third, the affidavit filed by Daryao Singh, who was a peon attached to the office of the Land Acquisition Officer. The three versions are diametrically inconsistent. Consequently, there is no acceptable version found from the record. In those circumstances, unless it is proved to the hilt that substance of the notification was in fact published in the locality, the acquisition cannot be declared to be valid in law. The benefit of doubt should go to the owners in upholding the acquisition as it is an expropriatory action. The High Court, therefore, had not considered this aspect of the matter in the proper perspective. Consequently, when the special leave petitions came to be filed in this Court, this Court had called upon the respondents to produce the original record. Since the records had not been produced, adverse inference was drawn and unqualified leave was granted though notice was limited to 2nd point. These circumstances would clearly indicate that there is no compliance of the requirement of publication of the substance of Section 4(1) notification in the locality. Resultantly, the presumption available under Section 114 (e) of the Evidence Act stands displaced. The High Court, therefore, was clearly in error in holding that the substance of the notification under Section 4(1) was published in the locality.