(1.) This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High court, made on 16/11/1986 in Rs. A No. 848 of 1977.
(2.) The admitted and proved facts are that one Dalip Kaur; daughter of Inder Singh was the owner of the property in question. She sold the property on 14/4/1967 to Smt Jeth Kanwar. Zail Singh had filed a suit for preemption of the sale and obtained a decree of preemption on 9/10/1969. Thereafter, he sought to interfere with the possession of the appellant who was admittedly in possession of the said property. Therefore, the appellant filed the suit in question for perpetual injunction restraining Zail Singh and any other person from interfering with his possession. He claimed to be a tenant prior to 1957 from Dalip Kaur and was, therefore, entitled to remain in possession uninterruptedly as such. The trial court found that he was in possession as a tenant prior to 1957 and accordingly granted the decree ofperpetual injunction against the respondents. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the decree holding that the appellant had come into possession of the suit property some time in 1968 after the sale was made in favour of Jeet Kanwan. Since Dalip Kaur had preempted the property sold by her mother, the tenancy right created by Jeet Singh in favour of the appellant did not bind Jeet Singh-defendant. Having obtained the preemption, he had right to take physical possession of the property dispossessing the appellant. As a consequence, the injunction was not correct in law. That was affirmed by the High court in the second appeal following the ratio of the judgment of the full bench of the High court in Hukam Singh v. Hakumat Rai.
(3.) Mr. Prem Malhotra, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, contends that even accepting the finding of the appellate court, without conceding that he was not a tenant prior to 1957, the findings recorded by the appellate court are unsustainable in law and the application of the judgment of the full bench to the facts in this case is not warranted. Therefore, the decree of the trial court is correct in law. In support thereof, he relied upon Propositions (i) , (ii) and (iv) laid in the judgment of the full bench which read as under: