(1.) Respondent 2 was employed as driver of a motor vehicle in the industry of the appellant. According to the medical opinion, his eyesight was found defective and the medical report certified that he was not fit for driving a motor vehicle. This led to the termination of the service of the respondent by order dated 25-9-1981. The respondent challenged the termination of his service by raising an industrial dispute, but the same was rejected by an award dated 30-11-1985 made by the Labour Court. The respondent then challenged that award by writ petition filed in the High Court. The High court accepted the above finding of fact about the medical unfitness of the respondent to function as driver of a motor vehicle, but placing reliance on the definition of "retrenchment" contained in Section 2 (s) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 instead of the definition contained in section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it has held that such a termination amounts to retrenchment. Accordingly, the High Court has granted the relief of reinstatement with full back wages to the respondent. This appeal by special leave is against that judgment.
(2.) Learned counsel for the respondent workman submitted at the outset that the workman has crossed the age of superannuation long back and therefore, no interference under Article 136 of the Constitution is called for with the High Court's order granting relief to this workman. Learned counsel for the respondent in all fairness did not dispute the fact that the provision of section 25-J in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was overlooked by the High court which makes it clear that the definition of "retrenchment" contained in the Central Act, i. e. Section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is to be the basis for deciding the controversy in the present case. The definition of "retrenchment" contained in Section 2 (oo) clearly says that retrenchment does not include "termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill health". It cannot be disputed that the unfitness of the respondent on medical ground to function as a driver of a motor vehicle on account of failing eyesight could not therefore, be treated as retrenchment to permit grant of the relief which the High Court has given to him. It is necessary to say so for the purpose of correcting the conclusion reached by the High Court on this question of law.
(3.) Having said as above, we are inclined to accept the submission of learned counsel for the respondent that the relief granted by way of payment already received by the respondent may not be set aside since he has already crossed the age of superannuation on account of which the question of his continuance in service does not arise. Learned counsel for the appellant is agreeable to this suggestion and also offers that any payment that may be remaining due on the basis of termination of his service being valid, will also be paid to him promptly.