STATE OF TAMIL NADU Vs. L KRISHNAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the division bench of the Madras High court made in WP No. 6169 of 1983 on 22/4/1991. Notification under Section 4 (1 of the Land Acquisition Act (Act 1 of 1894 (for short "the Act") was published on 29/8/1975 acquiring large extent of land for planned development of K. K. Nagar in Madras city. The declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published on 28/9/1978. The award under Section 11 of the Act was made in February 1983. The writ petition was filed on 28/7/1983 questioning the notification under Section 4 (1 of the Act on the ground that the notification was vague and invalid since the government had not formulated specific scheme for construction of the houses. That contention found favour with the High court and consequently it quashed the notification in the first instance, which order was upheld by this court in State of T. N. v. A. Mohd. Yousef. Following the said decision, this writ petition along with other writ petitions was allowed by the division bench. This court in State of T. N. v. L. Krishnan had held that the scheme as envisaged under the Tamil Nadu Housing Board Act was not required to be completely formulated before publication of the notification under Section 4 (1 of the Act. The notification on that account, therefore, was not vague. Same contention has been raised in this appeal; butspecific argument was made at the time that there is a distinguishing feature on factual background and that. therefore, it was required to be separately dealt with. Accordingly, this appeal was separated. Thus, we are hearing this appeal independently.

(2.) Shri A. Mariarputham, learned counsel for the appellants, contended that the respondents had laid their claim on the basis that the sanction for layout from the Director, Town Planning was obtained as early as in 1970 and the notifications were issued by the government from time to time excluding such lands and on that premise the respondents claimed exclusion. But the government after elaborate consideration in GOMs No. 583 dated 11/3/1983 had withdrawn the earlier notifications and several writ petitions were filed after that order was passed. The foundation on the basis of which the writ petition was filed was knocked of its bottom. The High court was not, therefore, right in granting the relief to the respondents. Dr Shankar Ghosh, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, contended that since the notifications had been quashed in respect of some other lands covered in the same notifications, the respondents stand in the same position as others and are entitled to the same benefit. Though we had adjourned the appeal to get particulars relating to the cases in which exclusion of the lands covered in the same notification and for what grounds was made, Mr Mariarputham stated that in spite of his best efforts to get the correct information, he was unable to get the information from the government and that, therefore, he is not in a position to place any factual material on the basis of which the lands were withdrawn either by the orders of the court and for what purpose. Reasons for such omission are not far to seek.

(3.) However, he has pointed out that the earlier orders by the court relate to the lands for the establishment of outstation bus stand and also wholesale fruit market. Since they also serve public purpose, the withdrawal of the notifications in respect thereof does not have any effect on the planned development under the scheme. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is any invalidity in the notification for being quashed. We find force in the contention. Dr Ghosh submitted that though the respondents are two families, the numbers are as many as 19 and they require construction of houses for self-occupation. The scheme being for the planned development of a residential township and since the land acquired by them is for that purpose, the land required by them may also be considered for exclusion for the construction of their own houses for residential purpose. The extent of land in question in this appeal is 20 acres and odd.