STATE OF TAMIL NADU Vs. TVL JEEVANLAL LIMITED

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The aforesaid three civil appeals by special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India filed by the common appellant State of Tamil Nadu and the two special leave petitions also moved by the same State of Tamil Nadu and which are ordered to be tagged with the aforesaid civil appeals, raise a common question for our consideration. The common appellant, State of Tamil Nadu, in all these proceedings, seeks to challenge identical decisions rendered by different Division Benches of the Madras High Court impugned in Civil Appeal No. 2295 of 1980, and Civil Appeal No. 4550 of 1984, as well as in the companion special leave petitions; while in Civil Appeal No. 3442 of 1983, the State of Tamil Nadu seeks to challenge the decision of Full Bench of the same High Court concurring with the decisions of the Division Benches of the High Court taking the same view. The short question which is posed for our consideration by the appellant-State of Tamil Nadu in these proceedings is as to whether the Board of Revenue functioning under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") can revise in exercise of its suo motu revisional jurisdiction that part of the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner which is against the Revenue when the other part of this very order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner against the assessee is made subject-matter of an appeal before the Sales-tax Appellate Tribunal functioning under the same Act. In the impugned judgments the High Court has taken the view that once the assessee has carried the matter in appeal being aggrieved by that part of the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner which is against him, the entire order comes within the purview of the Appellate Tribunal and under these circumstances the Board of Revenue will have no jurisdiction to exercise suo motu revisional powers against the remaining part of the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner which is in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The appellant - State disputes the aforesaid conclusion reached by the High Court on the jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue.

(2.) Learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended before us that the High Court was in error when it took the view that once the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is challenged in appeal before the Appellate Tribunal by the assessee who is aggrieved by a part of the order against him the other part of the order which is in favour of the assessee and which is obviously not the subject-matter of the appeal before the Appellate Tribunal could not be examined by the Board of Revenue in exercise of its suo motu revisional powers with a view to seeing whether the order against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee was correct in law or not. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the assessee had no occasion to challenge that part of the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner which was in his favour and, therefore, the Tribunal was not seized of any inquiry regarding the validity of that part of the order. That part of the order, therefore, was outside the ken of the scrutiny of the Tribunal and consequently it could not be said that it was subject-matter of appeal before the Tribunal. Consequently the Board had ample power under Section 34 of the Act to examine the correctness of that part of the order.

(3.) Learned counsel for the respondent appearing in one of these matters, on the other hand, submitted that the High Court was justified in construing the sweep of Sections 34 and 36 of the Act which dealt with special powers of the Board of Revenue on the one hand and powers of the Appellate Tribunal on the other and in taking the view that once appeal is taken by the assessee before the Tribunal challenging that part of the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner which was against him the Tribunal would be seized of the entire matter and not in piecemeal and as the Tribunal has ample jurisdiction in appropriate cases even to enhance the assessment, of course, at the instance of the Revenue and after hearing the assessee appellant before it, the field of controversy would be occupied by the Appellate Tribunal's jurisdiction and consequently the Board of Revenue would lose its jurisdiction to trench upon that field of controversy between the parties. It was, therefore, contended that the High Court was right in taking the view that the impugned orders of the Board of Revenue under Section 34 of the Act in these proceedings were incompetent and accordingly they were rightly set aside by the High Court.