STATE OF GUJARAT Vs. THAKKAR DEVCHANDBHAI LALJIBHAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Special leave granted.

(2.) Heard counsel on both sides.

(3.) The short question concerns the interpretation of Section 61-A of the indian Forest Act introduced by the Gujarat Amendment Act, 1983. Subsection (1) of that section begins with a non obstante clause and provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the provisions immediately preceding in that chapter or any other law for the time being in force, where a forest offence is believed to have been committed in respect of any forest produce belonging to the State Government, the officers seizing the property shall without any unreasonable delay produce it, together with the vehicle used in the commission of such offence, before the Forest Officer. Sub-section (2) next provides that where the Forest Officer seizes the forest produce belonging to the State Government or where the property is produced before the Forest Officer and he is satisfied that a forest offence was committed in respect thereof, he may, whether or not a prosecution is instituted for the commission of such forest offence, order confiscation of the property so seized together with, inter alia, the vehicle used in the commission of such an offence. On a plain reading of this sub-section it becomes clear that once it is found that a forest offence was committed in respect of forest produce belonging to the State Government and the Forest Officer is satisfied that such offence was committed, he can order confiscation of the seized property together with all tools etc. including the vehicle used in the commission of such an offence. The learned Additional Sessions Judge in para 15 of his judgment, however, took the view that since a forest offence was complete as soon as the muddamal charcoal was manufactured, it could not be said that the motor truck was used in committing the forest offence and in manufacture of the muddamal charcoal. He. however, notices that the muddamal truck was used for carrying or transporting the muddamal charcoal already manufactured but opined that since the offence was complete prior to the carriage of the charcoal the section did not empower the confiscation of the vehicle. We find it difficult to agree with this line of reasoning because in our view it runs counter to the plain language of section 61-A (2). But we find that in the instant case apart from the passage of time after the impugned judgment was affirmed by the High Court the truck was released and before this Court's order dated 3-4-1989 imposing a condition for release was served on the respondent, he had disposed of the truck. Therefore, even though in law we disagree with the view taken by the courts below, we do not think we can, in any manner, recall the truck at this stage of the proceedings. The appeal is, therefore, disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.