VIJAY SINGH Vs. VIJAYALAKSHMI AMMAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These appeals have been filed on behalf of the tenants of premises bearing No. 76, in Car Street, Thirupapuliyur in the State of Tamil Nadu. According to the appellants, the said premises had been let out for non-residential purposes and the appellants had been paying the monthly rent regularly. The respondent, who is the landlady (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) filed petitions before the Rent Controller for eviction of the appellants under Section 14(1) (b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It was alleged in the petitions aforesaid that the building in question was an old one and was situated in a very busy locality of the town where a number of buildings in and around the building in question had been demolished and shopping complex had been constructed with modern amenities, and as such the respondent also wanted to demolish the entire building in order to construct a new shopping complex for which necessary permission from municipal authorities had already been obtained. It was also claimed on behalf of the respondent that she had sufficient financial resources for construction of the new building. An undertaking was given on behalf of the respondent that the work of demolition of the building would commence within one month and would be completed before the expiry of three months from the date the said respondent recovered possession of the building. Those petitions were resisted on behalf of the appellants saying that the building was not an old one and it can stand for many more years to come. It was also denied that the respondent had sufficient financial resources to construct a new shopping complex. By a common order the Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the requirement of the entire building for purpose of demolition and reconstruction by the respondent was bona fide and as such the respondent was entitled to an order of eviction of the appellants from the respective portions in their possession. Appeals filed on behalf of the appellants against the said order were dismissed by the appellate authority affirming the findings recorded by the Rent Controller. Civil revision applications filed on behalf of the appellants before the High Court were dismissed at the stage of admission itself saying that in view of the concurrent findings of the Courts below in respect of the bona fide requirement of the respondent for purpose of demolition and reconstruction, there was no occasion for interference by the High Court on the civil revision petitions filed on behalf of the appellants.

(2.) The aforesaid orders are being questioned in these appeals on the ground that Rent Controller could not have directed eviction merely on the ground that the respondent wanted to demolish the building in question for reconstruction of a new shopping complex; any such order could have been passed only after the respondent had satisfied the rent Controller, that the requirements and conditions prescribed under Section 14(1) (b) of the Act have been fulfilled. The relevant portion of Section 14 provides:

(3.) On a plain reading of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 14 it appears that it is applicable when the landlord requires possession of the building for carrying out repairs which cannot be carried out without the building being vacated. So far clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 14 is concerned it contemplates a situation where there is a bona fide requirement of the building by the landlord, for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and such demolition is to be made for purpose of erecting a new building on the site. It may be pointed out that in view of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 14 where the building has been vacated for repairs the building has to be offered to the tenant who had delivered possession in pursuance of an order of the Rent Controller for re-occupation. No such condition has been prescribed where order of eviction has been passed under clause (b) of sub-section (l) of Section 14 i.e. for immediate purpose of demolishing it in order to erect a new building on the site. In other words, once the Rent Controller is satisfied that the requirement of the landlord of the building for immediate purpose of demolition and reconstruction was bona fide there is no scope for passing an order directing the landlord to allow any portion of the reconstructed building to be re-occupied by the tenant who had been evicted. In this background, the question which falls for consideration is as to whether for eviction of the tenant of the building under Section 14(1)(b) the landlord has to satisfy the Rent Controller that the condition of the building is such that it is immediately required to be demolished. Whether the expression immediate purpose of demolishing has any nexus with the age and condition of the building or it indicates only the immediate need and urgency of the landlord to demolish such building in order to reconstruct a new one on the same site. If it is held that Section 14(1) (b) vest power in the Rent Controller to direct the tenant to deliver possession of the building to the landlord no sooner the Rent Controller is satisfied that the landlord is in a position to immediately demolish the building in question in order to construct a new building on the said site, it will go against the fundamental concept of statutory regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship in urban areas, where special provisions have been made different from the rights and obligations of the landlord and tenant under the Transfer of property Act, With the population explosion and cry for a roof in the urban areas a situation was created where the Legislatures of different States had to enact Acts regulating the conditions on which premises in such areas are to be let out and tenants are to be evicted. By and large there is no uniformity in the provisions applicable to different States. As such from time to time High Court has to construe the scope of special provisions of a particular State and to say what is the object behind the same. So far Section 14 (1) (b) is concerned, in the case of Metalware and Co. v. Bansilal Sharma and Co. (1979) 3 SCC 398:(P.1562), it was said: