LAWS(SC)-1996-4-69

KARTAR KAUR Vs. AJMER SINGH

Decided On April 19, 1996
KARTAR KAUR Appellant
V/S
AJMER SINGH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant is the widow of one late Ranjit Singh who was admittedly the owner of the property in question. The respondent is the son of Ranjit Singh. He filed a suit, out of which this appeal arises, for seeking declaration that he was the exclusive owner of the property and mutation entries made in the name of the appellant are incorrect. Decree for possession was also prayed. The respondent's case was that he being the son and the appellant being a widow of Ranjit Singh, he alone was entitled to succeed to the property as per the custom prevailing in the society. The appellant, who was the sole defendant, asserted that as per custom she also was entitled to succeed. Ownership over the suit property was claimed because of acquisition of title on the basis of adverse possession too. The trial court dismissed the suit by answering Issues 3, 4 and 5 against the plaintiff, though it had answered Issue 1 reading: "whether the plaintiff is the sole owner of the property in the suit - in the affirmative. On appeal being preferred, the Additional District Judge decreed the suit. The appellant carried the matter to the High court in second appeal which was dismissed. Hence this appeal.

(2.) A perusal of the judgment of the trial court shows that the following were Issues 3, 4 and 5:

(3.) The appellate court decided Issue 3 relating to limitation in favour of the respondent and disbelieved the case of the appellant regarding her having become owner of property by adverse possession. As to the claim of the appellant to succeed because of special custom, the learned Additional, District Judge observed that it was well settled that under the general custom a widow was not entitled to inherit property in the presence of a son. When the provisions of the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 were pressed into service by the appellant, the court observed that the Act was not applicable to PEPSU where the land was situate for reasons given in paragraph 9 of the judgment. The High court has apparently accepted this position.