MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE SIRHIND Vs. PARSHOTAM DASS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Leave granted.

(2.) This appeal by way of special leave is directed against the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High court in Regular Second Appeal No. 1187 of 1989 arising out of a suit against the defendant Municipal Committee for a declaration that the land entered in Khewat No. 391 measuring 321 kanals 14 marlas and in Khewat No. 392 measuring 1197 kanals 5 marlas in Village Brahman Majra, Tehsil Sirhind as fully described in paras A and B of the plaint are the properties of the plaintiffs and they are the khewatdars and defendant should be permanently injuncted from dispossessing the plaintiffs.

(3.) The plaintiffs' case in a nutshell is that they are khewatdars of Village Brahman Majra and they filed the suit in representative capacity under Order I Rule 8 Civil Procedure Code. It was alleged that Khasra Nos. 391 and 392 measuring 321 kanals 14 marlas in Khewat No. 392 measuring 1197 kanals 5 marlas respectively are "shamlat deh" and it was under Nagar Panchayat. By a notification dated 18/9/19688 the municipal limits of Sirhind Municipality was extended covering a part of Gram Sabha area of Nagar Panchayat and the disputed area came under the Municipal Limits. It is further averred that Gram Sabha of the village having been abolished, the lands in question reverted to the original khewatdars under the proviso to Rule 3 of the Gram Panchayat Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules"). When Punjab government acquired a portion of the said land for construction of godown for storing foodgrains, an award was passed on 19-3-1977 by Collector, Patiala and thereafter the reference having been made to the District Judge under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. the said District Judge determined the compensation to be payable to the plaintiffs even though the defendant Municipal Committee also claimed compensation. The said decision therefore, operates as res judicata against the defendant in the present proceeding. It was also further averred that mutation was ordered in favour of the plaintiffs by the Collector by order dated 8/8/1975. A revision being carried out by the Municipal Committee, the Financial Commissioner set aside the said order by his order dated 13/5/1982 and directed mutation in favour of Municipalcommittee and therefore the plaintiffs filed the suit for the relief as already stated. The defendant Municipal Committee in the written statement took the stand that the disputed property though "shamlat deh" was a part of Gram Sabha. But on and from the date of issuance of notification extending the municipal limits of Sirhind over the area, it formed a part of the municipality and therefore the Municipal Committee has right, title and interest to the land. It was also further averred that the compensation amount having been awarded in favour of the plaintiffs on a finding that the acquired land forms a part of plaintiffs' proprietary interest, the principle of res judicata will not apply. On these pleadings the learned trial Judge framed as many as 7 issues and on Issues 1 to 3 came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are the khewatdars of Village Brahman Majra, and are owners of the suit land and the ownership of the land vests with the proprietor of the village and not in the Municipal Committee. On Issue 4 the trial Judge found that the question of title to the suit land has finally and conclusively been decided by the learned Additional District Judge, Patiala in reference under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act and the said decision operates as res judicata in the present proceedings. On Issue 6 the learned trial Judge came to hold that valid notice under Section 49 of the Punjab Municipal Act had been duly served upon the defendant before filing of the present suit. With these findings the suit having been decreed, the defendant carried the matter in appeal. The learned Additional District Judge, Patiala confirmed the findings of the trial Judge and dismissed the appeal. The defendant Municipal Committee then carried the matter to the High court in second appeal and the same having been dismissed, the defendant Municipal Committee has approached this court.