LAWS(SC)-1996-10-234

RAMESHWAR JUTE MILLS Vs. UNION OF INDIA

Decided On October 29, 1996
RAMESHWAR JUTE MILLS Appellant
V/S
UNION OF INDIA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant filed a writ petition in 1992 challenging an order dated September 29,1989 made by the Regional Provident Fund commissioner under Section 7-A of the employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous provisions Act, 1952 ("the Act"). The High Court has dismissed the writ petition on the ground of laches taking the view that the impugned order being made on September 29, 1989, the writ petition filed on July 28, 1992 was delayed for which there was no cogent explanation. Accordingly, the appellant's case on merits has not been decided by the High Court.

(2.) There is no dispute that the appellant had promptly filed a review application against the order dated September 29, 1989 purporting to be under Section 7-B of the Act, introduced by the amending Act of 1988. However, the notification required for bringing into force this amendment inserting Section 7-B in the principal act has not been issued with the result that both sides discovered much later that there was no power of review available under the Act till section 7-B was brought into force. The review petition was dismissed for this reason on March 26, 1992 and the writ petition was filed on July 28,1992 with the summer vacations intervening. The submission of learned counsel for the; petitioner is that this legislative history of the Act is by itself sufficient to explain the intervening period which has been treated by the High Court as unexplained delay. In our opinion, this submission has to be accepted.

(3.) The impression not only of the appellant but also of the authorities concerned for a long time was that the power of review was available and it is for this reason that the review petition came to be dismissed on this ground after a considerable period. The period of pendency of the review petition should not, therefore, have been treated as period of delay, even if any specific period of limitation was prescribed for filing the writ petition much less for being treated as a ground to dismiss the petition for laches. The dismissal of the writ petition by the High court on the ground of laches without going into the merits thereof cannot, therefore, be sustained.