NAGAWWA Vs. VEERANNA SHIVALINGAPPA KONJALGI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Karnataka High Court by which it set aside the order of the Additional Judicial magistrate, First Class, Gokak issuing process against respondents 1 and 2 in the exercise of his discretion under Sec. 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The facts of the case lie within a very narrow compass and although the High Court has taken great pains to write a laboured judgment the point involved is short and simple and does not merit a detailed discussion. The police of Gokak Police Station submitted a charge-sheet against Nagappa Giddennavar and seven others under Sections 302, 114, 148, 147 and other sections on the allegations that on July 19, 1973 the accused persons had waylaid and murdered one Nagappa son of the appellant in this Court. The appellant, who had filed the report before the police does not appear to have been satisfied with the investigation by the police which according to her was tainted and had suppressed some important materials, filed a complaint before the Magistrate at Gokak on October 4, 1973 alleging that respondents 1 and 2 had in fact abetted the offence of murder committed by the other accused but as they were influential persons their names were deliberately left out in the report as also in the dying declaration. On receiving the complaint on October 4, 1973 the Magistrate decided to hold an inquiry into the complaint himself and in pursuance of his decision he recorded some evidence on October 8, 1973. Thereafter the case was posted for October 10, 1973 for arguments and further evidence, if any. On October 10, 1973 the Magistrate observed that six witnesses had been examined and the evidence recorded so far was sufficient for the Court to determine the question as to whether or not process should be issued to respondents 1 and 2. He then adjourned the case for argument for October 12, 1973. On that day arguments were heard but before any order could be passed the Magistrate who had recorded the evidence was transferred and therefore the case had to be adjourned. The new Magistrate took up the matter on November 26, 1973 and after hearing the complainant he adjourned the case to December 3, 1973 and on this day he directed that further inquiry may be made by Superintendent of Police, Belgaum and he accordingly referred the matter for inquiry and report to the Superintendent of Police, Belgaum asking him to submit his report within six weeks. It seems to us that in view of the change of the Magistrate the successor Magistrate was not able to grasp the implications of the proceedings which had been taken by his predecessor who had in fact first decided to hold an inquiry himself and after recording the evidence had decided to pass an order under Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Before however he could pass any order he was succeeded by the present Magistrate. The appellant filed an application in revision to the High Court on December 11, 1973 against the order ofthe Magistrate dated December 3, 1973 referring the matter to the Superintendent of Police for inquiry and report. While the application was pending before the High Court, respondents 1 and 2 field a petition before the High Court praying for an early hearing of the revision and for vacation of the stay order. Along with this petition the respondents filed a number of documents including the copies of the petition sent by the appellant to the Chief Minister and the Speaker. We might indicate here that there was absolutely no occasion for the respondents to have filed the documents before the High Court in a miscellaneous petition nor did they obtain any permission of the Court for filling those documents. The High Court, after hearing the revision application filed by the appellant, allowed the same mainly on the ground that as the Magistrate had ultimately decided to hold an inquiry into the truth or falsehood of the complaint himself he had no jurisdiction to stop that inquiry and then make a reference to the police afresh. The High Court accordingly quashed the order of the Magistrate and directed him to decide the case in accordance with the law after recording further evidence, if any. It appears that the High Court did not give any directions to the Magistrate for considering the documents which had been filed by the respondents before it but by a subsequent order merely forwarded the documents to the Magistrate. The papers were sent back to the Magistrate on January 7, 1975 and by his order dated January 27, 1975 the Magistrate was informed that the appellant did not want to adduce any further evidence. The matter was accordingly posted for argument on February 7, 1975 and after hearing the arguments and considering the evidence recorded by the Magistrate he by his order dated February 11, 1975 directed process to be issued against respondents 1 and 2 under Section 204 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Respondents 1 and 2 then preferred a revision against this order to the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure praying that the order of the Magistrate may be quashed. This revision was allowed by the High Court by the impugned order against which special leave was granted by this Court at the instance of the appellant.

(2.) In support of the appeal Mr. H. B. Datar submitted that the Magistrate had given cogent reasons for holding that there were sufficient grounds for proceeding against respondents 1 and 2 and the High Court was in error in interfering with the order of the Magistrate by examining the merits of the case after taking into consideration the documents filed by the respondents which could not be looked into by the Magistrate as they did not form part of the complaint or the evidence recorded in support thereof. In our opinion the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is well founded and must prevail. Mr. H.C. Bhandare sought to repel the argument of the appellant on the ground that the order of the Magistrate was perverse and as the case was full of patent absurdities and was politically motivated the prosecution of respondents 1 and 2 would amount to unnecessary harassment resulting in abuse of the process of the Court. In the view we take in the instant case it is not necessary for us to enter into the merits of the case at this stage. It is well settled by a long catena of decisions of this Court that at the stage of issuing process the Magistrate is mainly concerned with the allegations made in the complaint or the evidence led in support of the same and he is only to be prima facie satisfied whether there are sufficient grounds for proceedings against the accused. It is not the province of the Magistrate to enter into a detailed discussion of the merit or de-merits of the case nor can the High Court go into this matter in its revisional jurisdiction which is a very limited one.

(3.) In Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose, (1964) 1 SCR 639 this Court had after fully considering the matter observed as follows: