PREM CHAND Vs. DISTRICT JUDGE DEHRADUN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal by special leave is by the tenant (to be described hereinafter as the appellant) and is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad in a writ petition at his instance which was dismissed. The District Judge, Dehradun, who had earlier dismissed his appeal, has been impleaded as respondent No. 1.

(2.) The facts may briefly be stated: The appellant is admittedly the tenant under the 2nd respondent (to be described hereinafter as the respondent) in respect of two rooms of House No. 11, Raipur Road, Dehradun. This house has four rooms of which only two rooms are in occupation of the appellant. The other two rooms are in occupation of the respondent whose two sons stay there; the elder one living with his wife. The respondent is an old lady with an ailing husband and wants to have vacant possession of the two rooms so that the entire family can reside at the same place. With that end in view, on June 22, 1972, the respondent filed an application under Section 3 of the United Provinces (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (U. P. Act No. III of 1947) for permission to bring a suit against the appellant for his eviction on the ground of bona fide personal requirement. During the pendency of this application before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting. Rent and Eviction) Act 1972 (U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972) (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) came into force with effect from July 15, 1972, repealing the earlier Act of 1947 with certain savings as mentioned in Section 43 of the Act. As a consequence of enforcement of the Act the proceedings under Section 3 that were pending under the earlier Act were converted into one under Section 21 of the new Act (U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972). The prescribed authority (The Additional District Magistrate) rejected the application. The respondent then preferred an appeal to the District Judge, Dehradun, who allowed the same on the ground of bona fide requirement relying on the sole ground that Explanation (iv) to Section 21 (1) of the Act was applicable to the facts of the case. The appellant being aggrieved by the order of the District Judge preferred a writ application before the High Court which, as stated earlier, was disallowed.

(3.) Before we deal with the question of law raised in this appeal we may note the findings of fact reached by the District Judge. The District Jude found as follows:-