L BABU RAM Vs. RAGHUNATHJI MAHARAJ

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal by certificate is directed against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court reversing a decree passed by the Civil Judge, Etah. The original decree was passed by the Civil Judge, on 31st March, 1953 in a suit instituted on 10th August, 1950. The judgment of the High Court reversing it was given on 31st January, 1964. It took nearly eleven years for the High Court to dispose of the appeal before it. Then followed an appeal to this Court by certificate. The certificate proceedings took about four years. It was on 22nd January, 1968 that the certificate was granted. The appeal which came to be filed on the strength of this certificate had then to undergo a period of incubation in this Court for about eight years before this Court could get time to take it up for hearing. At long last, the unfortunate and heroic saga of this litigation is coming to an end. It has witnessed a silver jubilee, thanks to our system of administration of justice and our callousness and indifference to any drastic reforms in it. Cases like this, which are not infrequent, should be sufficient to shock our social as well as judicial conscience and activise us to move swiftly in the direction of overhauling and restructuring the entire legal and judicial system. The Indian people are very patient, but despite their infinite patience, they cannot afford to wait for twenty-five years to get justice. There is a limit of tolerance beyond which it would be disastrous to push our people. This case and many others like it strongly emphasise the urgency of the need for legal and judicial reform. A little tinkering here and there in the procedural laws will not help. What is needed is a drastic change, a new outlook, a fresh approach which takes into account the socio-economic realities and seeks to provide a cheap, expeditious and effective instrument for realisation of justice by all sections of the people, irrespective of their social or economic position or their financial resources.

(2.) The dispute in this appeal relates to a property situate in the town of Etah. The property consists of a residential house and three shops. One Shri Krishna Das was the owner of the property and by a deed dated 18th October, 1884 he made a disposition of the property in favour of his daughter-in-law Smt. Deva. Smt. Deva in her turn executed two gift deeds, one dated 13th January, 1915 in respect of two shops in favour of Shri Raghunathji Maharaj, the 1st respondent and the other dated 18th June, 1949 in respect of the residential house and the remaining shop in favour of her daughter's son Mool Chand, the 2nd respondent. On the death of Smt. Deva. which occurred on 12th April, 1950, the appellant claiming to be the nearest collateral in the family of Shri Krishna Das, filed Suit No. 18 of 1950 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Etah claiming that under the deed 18th October, 1884 Smt. Deva was given only a life interest in the property and she was, therefore, not entitled to gift any portion of the property in favour fo the 1st or the 2nd respondent beyond her lifetime and on her death, he became the owner of the property as the nearest collateral in the family of Shri Krishna Das and hence was entitled to possession of the property from the 1st and the 2nd respondents. Respondents Nos. 3 to 9 were impleaded as defendants in the suit as they were tenants in respect of certain portions of the property. There was no contest against the claim of the appellant on the part of respondents Nos. 3 to 9 and they expressed their willingness to pay rent to whosoever was declared to be the owner of the property. The 1st and the 2nd respondents, however, seriously disputed the claim of the appellant and contended that Smt. Deva was the full owner of the property under the deed dated 18th October, 1884 and she was, therefore, entitled to gift portions of the property in favour of the 1st and the 2nd respondents and convey full title to them and the appellant had no right, title or interest in any portion of the property. The main question which, therfore, arose for consideration on these pleadings was as to what was the nature of the interest conveyed to Smt. Deva under the deed dated 18th October, 1884, whether it was life interest or full ownership. One other subsidiary question was also raised on the pleadings and that was whether the 2nd respondent was the daughter's son of Smt, Deva. The trial Court held, on a construction of the deed dated 18th October, 1884, that Smt. Deva was only a life estate holder and she was, therefore, not entitled to convey title to the property in favour of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 beyond her lifetime and since the appellant was the nearest reversioner in the family of Shri Krishna Das, he became the owner of the property on her death and was accordingly entitled to possession of the same from respondents Nos. 1 and 2. The trial Court also found from the evidence on record that the 2nd respondent was the son of the daughter of Smt. Deva, but on the view taken by it in regard to the construction of the deed dated 18th October, 1884, it decreed the suit of the appellant. The decree was, however, reversed by the High Court in appeal at the instance of respondents Nos. 1 and 2. The High Court did not set aside the finding of the trial Court that the 2nd respondent was the son of the daughter of Smt. Deva but, on the question of construction of the deed dated 18th October, 1884, it took a different view. The High Court held that what was given to Smt. Deva under the deed dated 18th October, 1884 was full ownership and the gift deeds executed by her were valid and effective and the appellant consequently did not acquire any right, title or interest in the property on her death. In the result, the suit of the appellant was dismissed by the High Court. The appellant thereupon preferred the present appeal in this Court by obtaining a certificate from the High Court.

(3.) It is not necessary for the purpose of this appeal to decide which of the two constructions of the deed dated 18th October, 1884 is correct. whether the one adopted by the trial Court or the one which found favour with the High Court. We will assume with the appellant that the construction placed by the trial Court is correct and that accepted by the High Court is erroneous. The deed dated 18th October, 1884, so far as material, runs as follows:-