STATE OF GUJARAT Vs. MUSAMIYAN IMAM HAIDER BUX RAZVI:CHIMAN LAL PERSHOTTAM DAS PATEL:DOONGERSEE AND SONS:GOSWAMI SHRI VRAJRAIJI RANCHHODLAL JI:MUSAMIGAN IMAM HAIDER BUX RAZVI:DOONGERSEE AND SONS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These three Appeals Nos. 1870 of 1970, 1871 of 1970 and 1445 of 1971 by certificate granted by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad under Article 133 (1) (b) and (c) of the Constitution of India against its common judgment and order dated April 25, 1969 shall be disposed of by this judgment.

(2.) The facts giving rise to these appeals are:On May 20, 1961, the Government of Gujarat issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) declaring that certain pieces of land in village Vasana, Taluka City, District Ahmedabad specified in Schedule thereto were likely to be needed for a public purpose viz. for construction of houses for members of Yogeshwarnagar Co-operative Housing Society Limited, Ahmedabad. On June 18, 1962, respondent No. 1 in Civil Appeal No. 1445 of 1971, owners of some pieces of the aforesaid land filed Special Civil Application No. 564 of 1962 in the High Court of Gujarat under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the aforesaid notification dated May 20, 1961 made under Section 4 of the Act and seeking to restrain the Government from proceeding further with the acquisition proceedings contending inter alia that the land could not be acquired for the benefit of the Company in which the public was not directly interested. Interim injunction sought by the petitioner in that petition having been refused, the Additional Special Land Acquisition Officer, Ahmedabad, appellant No. 2 in these appeals proceeded to hold the requisite enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act and submitted report to the Government on a consideration whereof the latter issued a notification under Section 6 of the Act on April 29, 1963. The notification inter alia stated that the lands mentioned in the Schedule thereto were needed to be acquired at the public expense for the public purpose specified in column 4 of the Schedule to the notification viz., the scheme undertaken by Shri Yogeshwarnagar Co-operative Housing Society Limited with the sanction of the Government. Notices under Section 9 (1) of the Act were served and the Special Land Acquisition Officer after holding the requisite enquiry made an award on December 21, 1963 determining the amount of compensation payable by the Government to the owners of the land. On demand being made for possession of land, respondent No. 1 in Civil Appeal No. 1870 of 1970, who is the owner of some pieces of land sought to be acquired brought another Special Civil Application No. 1100 of 1963 under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court challenging the aforesaid notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act and on his application, the High Court passed an interim order restraining the Government from taking possession of the lands. On April 15, 1966, the Government of Gujarat in supersession of the earlier resolution dated December 21, 1962 whereby it had sanctioned rupee one towards the cost of acquisition, passed another resolution sanctioning contribution of Rs. 500/- towards the cost of acquisition. Considering that the notification dated April 29, 1963, issued by it under Section 6 of the Act was illegal and invalid, the Government of Gujarat by notification dated April 28, 1966, cancelled its earlier notification dated April 29, 1963 issued under Section 6 of the Act and issued a fresh notification in respect of the same pieces of land under Section 6 of the Act on June 6, 1966. Respondent No. 1 in Civil Appeal No. 1445 of 1971 and petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 564 of 1962 thereupon amended its application with the leave of the Court so as to include a challenge to the validity of the fresh notification under Section 6 of the Act. The petitioner in the aforesaid Special Civil Application No. 1100 of 1963 did not amend his application but filed a fresh petition under Article 226 of the Constitution being Special Civil Application No. 218 of 1968 challenging the fresh notification under Section 6 of the Act. Yet another petition under Article 226 of the Constitution being Special Civil Application No. 1441 of 1966 was filed in the High Court on November 20, 1966 by respondent No. 1 in Civil Appeal No. 1871 of 1970 challenging the validity of the fresh notification dated June 6, 1966 issued under Section 6 of the Act. All these petitions were heard together. While the High Court by common judgment dated April 25, 1969 dismissed petition No. 1100 of 1963 as infructuous in view of the fresh notification under Section 6 of the Act, it allowed the other three aforesaid petitions following its earlier decision in Special Civil Applications Nos. 316, 625 and 811 of 1965 and quashed thfresh notification dated June 6, 1966 issued by the Government of Gujarat under Section 6 of the Act holding inter alia that the cancellation of the first Section 6 notification would, in any event, tantamount to withdrawal from acquisition and no subsequent notification under Section 6 of the Act could, thereafter be issued without a fresh notification under Section 4 of the Act. The appellants thereupon applied for and obtained certificate referred to above. It is how these appeals are before us.

(3.) Although two, important points were raised in the aforesaid writ petitions viz. (1) whether the acquisition of land for Co-operative Housing Society is a public purpose and (2) whether the Government could cancel the notification dated April 29, 1963 issued by it under Section 6 of the Act and issue a fresh notification dated April 28, 1966 under the said section of the Act, the first point does not survive and has rightly not been canvassed before us in view of the decisions of this Court in Ratilal Shankarbhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1970 SC 984, Pandit Jhandu Lal v. The State of Punjab, (1961) 2 SCR 459 and Ram Swarup v. The District Land acquisition Officer, Aligarh, AIR 1972 SC 2290. In these cases, it has been made clear that ordinarily the Government is the best authority to determine whether the purpose in question is a public purpose or not; it cannot be contended that a housing scheme for a limited number of persons cannot be considered as a public purpose; and the need of a section of the public may be a public purpose.