STATE OF BOMBAY Vs. R S NANJI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) By an order dated 12-5-1952, hereinafter referred to as the impugned order the Government of the State of Bombay requisitioned under S. 5, Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 (Bombay Act 33 of 1948), hereinafter referred to as the Requisition Act, the premises specified therein. The impugned order, so far as it is relevant to the present appeal, stated,

(2.) The respondent filed a writ application under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the Bombay High Court and the application was heard by Tendolkar J. who set aside the impugned order. Against his decision the appellant appealed and a Division Bench of the said Court affirmed the decision of Tendolkar J. The present appeal is by special leave against the decision of the High Court. 2a. The principal ground upon which the impugned order was set aside was that the requisition was not for a public purpose and therefore could not have been validily made under S. 5 of the Requisition Act.

(3.) On behalf of the appellant, the Attorney-General has urged that in the circumstances of the present case, the requisition was for a public purpose and the impugned order had been wrongly set aside by the High Court. In support of his submission he relied upon certain provisions of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950 (64 of 1950), hereinafter referred to as the Act, the decision of the Privy Council in case of - 'Hamabai Framjee Petit vs. Secy. of State', AIR 1914 PC 20(A) and the decisions of this Court in - 'State of Bombay vs. Bhanji Munji', AIR 1955 SC 41 (B) and - 'State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan', AIR 1955 SC 810 (C). On the other hand, Mr. Andley, on behalf of the respondent, contended that to requisition the premises to house an employee of the State Road Transport Corporation, hereinafter referred to as the Corporation, could not be regarded as a public purpose because that was a matter in which the general interest of the community was not directly and vitally concerned. He urged that although their Lordships of the Privy Council rightly approved the observations of Batchelor J; concerning the expression 'public purpose', they erred in their decision in 'Hamabai's case (A)'. In any event, 'Hamabai's case (A)' could be distinguished as in that case there was a scheme for constructing houses for Government servants generally and not procuring residential accommodation for one particular individual. The validity of the impugned order was also questioned by him on the ground that nothing had been established to prove that by housing an officer of the Corporation in the requisitioned premises the needs or the purposes of the Corporation would be served or that it would contribute to the efficiency of the officer concerned.