(1.) The State of Punjab and its functionaries are the appellants, in this appeal, directed against the final order and judgment dated 5.7.2001 passed in a Regular Second Appeal by a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court.
(2.) The controversy lies within a very narrow compass.
(3.) The respondent filed a Suit for a declaration that the order dated 5-7-1995 passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, PAP, Jalandhar Cantt. whereby his appeal was dismissed and the order dated 31-8-1994 passed by the Commandant, 13th Bn. PAP, Jalandhar Cantt dismissing him from service were not in order. The Commandant in departmental proceedings held that his absence from duty during the periods 8-2-1994 to 16-3-1994 and from 19-4-1994 to 24-4-1994 was to be treated as non duty and the period of suspension was to be held to have merged for all practical purposes. Respondent filed a Suit. His grievance was that the orders were in violation of the service rules, violative of principles of natural justice and, therefore, he was entitled to a declaration that he continued to serve the department as Head Constable, as was the position before 31-8-1994 with consequential reliefs. His case, as reflected in the plaint was that he was appointed as Constable on 27-7-1981 and was promoted as Head Constable in June, 1990. He remained absent on account of his ailment and went to his village for treatment after informing the Incharge Officer. An enquiry was conducted on the ground that he had unauthorisedly remained absent from duty. The enquiry officer had found him guilty and consequently, on the basis of the report of the enquiry officer, which was accepted by the disciplinary authority, he was dismissed from service on 31-8-1994. The appeal to the Deputy Inspector General of Police was also dismissed. The State of Punjab filed written statement and raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the Suit. On merits, it was stated that he was recruited as a Constable. He was promoted as Head Constable. The authority who had ordered his dismissal was the competent authority. This plea was raised to counter the plea of the plaintiff that the promotion having been given by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, he could be dismissed only by the said authority and not by the Superintendent of Police. The Trial Court decreed the Suit. Appeal filed before the Additional District Judge, Jalandhar was also dismissed. The primary reasons indicated by the first appellate authority was that the plaintiff having been appointed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police and not by the Superintendent of Police, the dismissal order, if any, could be passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police and not the Superintendent of Police. A Second Appeal under Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short the Code) was filed. The Second Appeal was also dismissed upholding the conclusions of the Trial Court and the first appellate Court so far as the authority of the Superintendent of Police to dismiss the respondent is concerned.