DHARAMPAL ARORA Vs. PUNJAB STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) LEAVE granted. This appeal is directed against the final order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dated February 13, 2004 passed in Regular Second Appeal No. 2332/1987. The appellant was working as an Assistant Revenue Accountant with the Punjab State Electricity Board. He was suspended vide order dated August 26, 1974. He was charge-sheeted vide Memo dated September 24, 1974. Thereupon, he was reinstated in service vide order dated August 25, 1975. The appellant was due to cross the efficiency bar w. e.f. October 4, 1974 but he was allowed to cross efficiency bar w. e.f. April 1, 1976 vide order dated October 10, 1980 passed by the respondent-Board. The period from September 4, 1974 to September 30, 1975 was treated as a non-duty period. An inquiry was held and an order was passed on March 16, 1984 whereby one annual grade increment of the appellant was stopped with future effect. The appellant filed a Civil Suit in the Court of senior Sub Judge, Patiala on April 28, 1984. The suit was filed for declaration and other incidental reliefs. The learned Trial Judge by judgment dated March 12, 1985 dismissed the suit filed by the appellant-plaintiff. Against the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, the appellant filed the first appeal before the Additional District Judge. Before the Additional District Judge, the appellant had specifically argued that the claim of the appellant was that he was deemed to have crossed the efficiency bar w.e.f. October 4, 1974 and that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the suspension period from September 4, 1974 to September 30, 1975. A further submission was made that the order dated March 16, 1984 was illegal because not only that the order was not speaking order but also that no show cause notice was served upon the appellant by the punishing authority after the report of the Inquiry Officer was submitted and further that the copy of the report of the Inquiry Officer was also not supplied to the appellant. The Additional District Judge categorically gave a finding that:

(2.) DESPITE the said finding, the First Appellate Court held that it was not essential for the Punishing Authority to supply the copy of the report of the Inquiry Officer to the appellant-plaintiff or to give him show cause notice prior to the passing of the impugned order. The Court also held the view that the report of the inquiry is to be furnished to the employees and show cause notice required to be given only in the case of major punishment. According to the First Appellate Court, since only minor punishment was imposed, there was no need of furnishing the copy of the inquiry report or to give a show cause notice to him before imposing the punishment against the appellant. In the result, the first appeal was dismissed by the Additional District Judge. Against the order of the Additional District Judge, the appellant filed Regular Second Appeal before the High Court, which was dismissed by the High Court in limine at the admission stage. Against the order of the High Court, the appellant filed special leave petition No. 2288/1988, in which leave was granted by this Court and the special leave petition was registered as Civil Appeal No. 2549/1988. This Court, while disposing the appeal, passed the following order:

(3.) SO far as the second question of law is concerned, the High Court held that the appellant has not filed the suit seeking declaration to the effect that order dated October 10, 1980 is null and void and, therefore, the said relief cannot be granted to him unless the order dated October 10, 1980 is set aside. Since the said order was not assailed by the appellant-plaintiff and the suit having been filed on May 4, 1984 i. e. after more than three years of the passing of the order Exhibit P-1, the High Court held that that the suit was clearly time barred. The High Court has further observed that even if viewed from any angle, the appellant-plaintiff could not be granted any relief in this behalf, and rejected the contention of the appellant on this point. Resultantly, the Second Appeal was partly allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below were set aside to the extent indicated above and the suit of the appellant stood decreed for declaration to the effect that the order No. 222/CAO dated March 16, 1984 stopping his one annual grade increment with future effect was declared to be illegal and void.